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I. INTRODUCTIO ,. 
Winston Churchill described him as "one of the greatest beings alive in our 
time."' King George V wrote, "(h]is name will live in history."2 The man they 
described was T.E. Lawrence. He was a World War I hero. an author. a scholar, a 
diplomat, and a designer.3 T.E. Lawrence was also a victim of rape.4 
The incident occurred during Lawrence's Arabian campaign in World War 1.5 
While on a covert scouting mission, Lawrence was captured in Deraa by the Turks.6 
He described what followed in vivid detail: 
They took me upstairs to the Bey's room; or to his bedroom rather ... 
. [H]e looked me over, and told me to stand up: then to turn round. I 
obeyed; he flung himself back on the bed, and dragged me down with him 
in his arms. When I saw what he wanted I twisted round and up again, 
glad to find myself equal to him, at any rate in wrestling . 
. . . . His face changed and he stood still, then controlled his voice with 
an effort, to say significantly, 'You must understand that I know: and it 
will be easier if you do as I wish.' ... (I] threw up my chin. which was the 
sign for ' No' in the East; then he sat down. and half-whispered to the 
corporal to take me out and teach me everything.7 
For his refusal, Lawrence suffered violent bnttality. The flesh over his ribs was 
pierced with a bayonet.8 He was lashed with a whip until he bordered on the edge of 
unconsciousness.9 He was kicked with boots and beaten.1° Finally, he describes. 
"(b ]y the bntises perhaps they beat me further: but I next knew that I was being 
'Editor's Note: In November 2008, § 2LI.2 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines was 
amended, effectively resolving the circuit split discussed herein. While portions of this Note 
have been amended to acknowledge this change, the detailed analysis of the circuit split based 
on the 2007 state of the Sentencing Guidelines is still relevant in discussing the application of 
commodity theory to punishing sex offenses and is left. unchanged. 
1Patricia Saville, Jacket to T.E. LAWRENCE. SEVEN PILLARS Of" WISDOM: A TRIUMPH 
(Doubleday & Co. 1966) ( 1926). 
2/d. 
3Jcremy Wilson. T.£. Lawrence: A Biographical Summmy. http://telawrence.info/telawrenceinfo/ 
Iife/biog_biog.shtml (last visited Mar. 4, 2009). 
4T.E. LAWRENCE, SEVEN PILLARS OF WISDOM: A TRIUMI'II 400 (Doubleday & Co. 1966) 
(1926). 
Sf d. 
6/d. at 396-97. 
1/d. at 398-99. 
~/d. at 398. 
9/d. at 399-400. 
10 /d. at 400. 
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dragged by two men, each disputing over a leg as though to split me apart: while a 
third man rode me astride. " 11 
Lawrence escaped his captors later that night. 12 While physically broken, he did 
not describe the need to mend his body, but rather his w ill. 13 His description of the 
incident concludes, " [I] carry the burden, whose certainty the passing days 
confirmed: how in Deraa that night the citadel of my integrity had been irrevocably 
lost."14 
Some academics argue that the choice to undergo physical violence rather than 
unwanted sex is not typical. They contend that most people would rather be 
subjected to unwanted sex than violence. 15 Based on this assumption, Donald Dripps 
argues that the traditional crime of rape should be replaced by a system based in 
commodity theory which punishes the use of violence to ach ieve sex. 16 Under this 
system, non-consensual sex that is not accompanied by " violence" would be treated 
as a misdemeanor. 17 Are these views defensible? Did Lawrence make the wrong 
choice? Should he have just submitted to unwanted sex? Is non-consensual sex 
really not that serious? 
No, sexual offenses inflict deeper harm than just the physical violence that may 
be used to achieve them. Non-consensual sex offenses are severe violations of an 
individual's will and should be punished seriously. As Joan McGregor stated: 
Taking away the power to consent to sexual relationships, to control this 
most personal part of our domain, is an extremely grave injury . . . . Rape 
not only denies the ability to control a central part of one's domain, but in 
doing so, it makes the victim a mere object, an instrument of her 
attacker's sexual grati fication Y 
While academics who argue that rape is nut a serious offense may be rare, the 
debate over defining and punishing sexual offenses, particularly offenses not 
II !d. 
12Jd. at 401. 
13/d. at 402. 
14/d. Unfortunately, the devastating ellects of sexual violation have not been relegated to 
history. In the United States, someone is sexually assaulted every two minutes. RAINN, 
Statistics, http://www.rainn.org/statistics/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2009). In 2007, there were 
248.300 victims of sexual assault. /d. 
15See Michael Davis, Selling Penalties: What Does Rupe Deserve?, 3 LAW & PHIL. 61 , 84 
( 1984) (arguing that if people are given a choit:e they would rather be raped than beaten); 
Donald A. Dripps, Be;vond Rape: An Essay on the D!f}erence Berween the Presence of Force 
and the Ahsence of Consent. 92 COLUM. L. R EV. 1780, 180 I ( 1992) (stating "as a general 
matter unwanted sex is not as bad as violence''). 
1 ~ Dripps. supra note 15, at 1796-97. 
17/d at 1804. Michael Davis argues that rape should be treated as simple battery. Davis, 
supra note I 5. at 61 . Under his system, the ··typical rapist probably would not receive . .. 
more than six-months imprisonment.,. !d. at 106. 
18JOAN McGREGOR, Is IT RAPE? ON A c QUAINTANCE RAPF. AND TAKING WOMEN' s CONSENT 
SERIOUSLY 225 (2005 ). 
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achieved through physical violence. is quite extensive. Until November 2008, there 
was a circuit split over whether non-consensual sex offenses should qualify under § 
2L 1.2 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines as a "crime of vioknce."10 While the 
judges deciding these cases never reterred to Donald Dripps' commodity theory tor 
punishing sex offenses. the debate between the circuits centered on one of Dripps' 
presuppositions- whether the severity of sexual crimes should be determined by the 
degree of physical force used to achiev~ them. 
This Note will examine commodity theory as a system for assigning punishment 
for sexual offenses in the context of the 2007 circuit split over defining "crime of 
violence" under § 2LI.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines. Part I I will discuss the 
problem of punishing sex offenses and describe Donald Dripps' proposed 
commodity theory solution. Part Il l wi ll discuss criticisms of using commodity 
theory as a basis for punishing sexual offenses. Part IV will provide background 
information on the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines generally and § 2L 1.2 of the 
Guidelines specifically and explain why the circuit split serves as an ideal 
opportunity to analyze Dripps' theory through judicial debate. Part V will examine 
in detail the reasoning and det.:isions on both sides of the circuit split. Part VI will 
discuss the inadequacies of the Ninth and Firth Circuits' decisions and highlight the 
shortcomings of Dripps' theot)'. Finally, Part VII will highlight the current changes 
to the Sentencing Guideline and address the need for ~.:hang ing perspectives on 
violations of the wi ll. 
II. PUNISHING SF.X OFFENSES 
A. The Problem 
Defining and punishing 5~xual ..:rim~s is problematic. The common law defined 
rape with a conjunction of two elements as ·•the carna l knowledge of a woman 
forcibly and against her will."20 "The conjunction or force and breaking the will ... 
implies ... that nothing short of vit>lence tv break the vit·tim's will can constitute a 
crime(.f"!1 The problem the conjunction creates is that physical violence becomes 
the t:mphasis ofthe crime.: at the c.x p~::nse ormargin<tlizing the victim's will. 
The use of the conjullcticn ,)f fore~.: and will, with an emphasis on force breaking 
the will, stems from both socit:ty's \·it:\\ ,)f .,exu:rlity and ~ol·icty·s evolving view of 
the genders-- particularly Of Wllii1CI1. ~lliCi.:t.y \' i t'W~ SC.\Ualil.y a~ dt.:sirabJe and 
naturally enjoyable to an extent that il c,lliJd be argued that the default view is that 
sex is to be sought and ·::njoye~L ~; ,\ s <t l'onsequent.:e l>f viewing sex as desirable, 
19United States v. Romero-I kmandi.'l. 5(!5 F.3d 1 O!i:?. l 0~7 ( I Oth Cir. 2007). 
2nDripps, .1upru note 15. at 1780 (quotillJ! 4 \\'i l.l lAM 13L·\CKSTO;\.E, CoMf\IENTARI~.s ON 
TilE LAWS OF EN( iLANil 2 I 0 I Oxf<1rd. Clarend(lll Pr.:s~ 1769)). 
21/d. 
22Th is vie..., ohe'< i~ e\ ide need by the <:'(h,;nsivc ur-c oJ' sexuality in commercial marketing. 
Studies have found that sex appeal in ctd~·eni~ing is atlention-gmh.bing. likable, arou'\ing. and 
memorable. Jessica Severn, George E Fkkh & !\·1ich<Jd A. Rekh. The E//'eNs of'Sexua/ am/ 
NIJn ·!>exuai Ad~'erlising Appeals and !l!li)l'lllatiun I.e; ei (;JI Cognifi<:c Prr~·essing and 
Communicarion L~~~~·ctiv.:tu:·' ·'· I 9 .1 . A llH R t "' '' ••; rH' . l <ot 14-22 ( !9<)0). Ads l'<)lltaini~lg se:-. 
appeal typically evoke positi.,c tecling~ in th;: audiem.:c lei. at 22. Often, there rs a positive 
relationship between the c~rousal ev~1ked by ~ex appc:1l 111 ad~ ;.;nd evaluations of tht: brand. 
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society views allegations of sex ual oftenses skeptically (she or he must have wanted 
it right?).~1 
More significantly, the historical view or the genders has added to society's 
skeptical treatment of sexual offenses. Throughout history, from ancient 
civilizations to the English law that served as a foundation for the U.S. system, 
women and t·emale sexuality were viewed as a possession ofmen.14 Historically, the 
law regarding sexual crimes runishcd the ortender. not for the violation of the 
victim, but for the violation of the men's rights who were associated with the female 
victim-her husband or other male family members.25 Furthermore. since males had 
rights over the exercise of female sexua lity, a female's exercise of sexuality apart 
from the will of her male possessors, either through adultery or fornication or even 
disagreement over the choice of a future mate, was strictly punished.26 A female's 
violation could often be punished with death.2 ' However, many ancient codes 
provided an exception tor lemaks who had been raped. !s Because of the exception, 
society viewed accusations or rape with the suspicion that the female accuser was 
simply asserting the charge to avoid punishment for her own lechery.29 Proof of 
force sufficient to overcome the will of the victim thus became necessary to 
overcome society's skepticism of a female's claim ofrape:10 
Whi le modern soc ieties have moved toward sexua l autonomy, women who make 
accusations of rape are still viewed with skepticism.31 The dual requirement of force 
and the breaking of the will persists as the predominate means of defining sexual 
otfenses.32 Force defines the sexual crime and consent provides a defense.33 
Michael S. LaTour. Robert t:. Pitts & David C. Snook-Luther. Female Nudiry, Arousal, and 
Ad Response: An Experimemal hmmigalion. 19 .1. AUVI!KTISING no.4. at 51, 51 ( 1990). 
23ANN J. CAHILL R nlllNKINti RAPE 11 9-20 (200 1 ). "We do not wish to hear the 
sufferings of rape victims. Such stories embarrass us and bring shame on those who tell them. 
and it seems that the main reason they do so is that we arc never quite certain that the victims 
are innocent.'' /d. at 120. 
24Dripps. supra note 15. at 1780-ll4 ( descrihing the punishment of sexual crimes according 
to ancient codes, Roman law. and English common law). 
15/d. at 1782. 
26/d. atl781-83. 
21ld. at 178 1. 
2s/d. at 1782. 
N/d. 
'
0/d. at 1780 n. l (citing Matthew Hale). Hale was so skeptical of rape ac.;usations that 
proof of nonconsent needed to be so clear that force was essentially inferred as a requirement 
for proving the oftense. !d. 
31 McGREGOR, supra note 18. at 232 ('"Society otien says to victims of rape 'If you only 
had not done x, this wouldn't have happened,' where x is ' looking sexy,' or 'dressing a 
particular way.' or 'drinking alcohol.' ur 'went to a man's apartment,' and so on.''). 
JlDripps. supra note 15. at 1780. Dripps notes th<ll New Jersey may be the only exception 
to the generalization that the United States defines sex offenses in terms of force and breaking 
the will. Jd at 1780 n.2. 
3;. /c/. at 1793-94. 
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2009
314 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:309 
Unfortunately, this system views sexual offenses in terms of the force used by the 
offender with little emphasis placed upon the will of the victim. 
The use of the conjunction of force and lack of consent in defining sexual 
offenses creates two problems. First, no matter how much force is used to perform 
the sexual act, consent can still be found to negate any wrongdoing. The textbook 
example is an incident in which a jury refused to convict an accused rapist because 
the victim was dressed lewdly despite the fact that the defendant had coerced the 
woman with a knife.34 Second, regardless of the fact that an offense is against the 
will of the victim, without the presence of physical fo rce the sexual act may be 
viewed as consensual. This result is illustrated in State v. Alston, in which, despite 
the victim' s tears and repeated protesting, the sexual act was viewed as consensual 
because of the absence of physical violence.35 
B. The Commodity The01y as a Solution 
Donald Dripps specifically identified these problems posed by the conjunction of 
force and consent and proposed a new system for defining and punishing sexual 
offenses.36 He argued that force and consent should be separated through a system 
founded on a concept of sexual autonomy based on John Locke's commodity 
theory.37 The commodity theory defines sexual autonomy in terms of a personal 
property right.3~ Essentially, every person has ownership over his or her individual 
body including the right to decide not to engage in sexual activity .3'~ Therefore, a 
violation of this property right over one's body occurs any time one person engages 
in sexual activity with the person of another either by force or without consent.40 
Dripps suggests redefining sexual offenses by distinguishing between "two quite 
distinct offenses calculated to obtain sexual gratification by culpable means. "41 
Under such a system, sex obtained by physical force and non-consensual sex would 
both be punished, but as separate offenses. 
34See Jwy: Woman in Rape Case "Asked for It, •· CHI. TRIB., Oct. 6, J 989. at C II ; see also 
LINDA BROOKOVER BOURQUE, DEFINING R.A.PE 4 { 1989) ("In the Spring of 1986. Pasadena 
Superior Court Judge Gilbert C. Alston dismissed charges of rape and sodomy brought by 
Rhonda DaCosta ... Judge Alston commented, 'A whore is a whore is a whore''"), 
) 5312 S.E.2d 470 (N.C. 1984). 
36Dripps, supra note 15. at 1797-1809. Professor Dripps wrote Beyond Rape while 
teaching at the University of Illinois College of Law. /d. at 1780. 
nld. at 1789. 
38
"Though the Earth, and all inferior Creatures be common to all Men, yet every Man has 
a Property in his own Person. This no Body has any Right to but himself.'' JOHN LOCKe. 
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 287 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) ( 1698), 
quoted in Dripps, supra note 15, at I 805 n. 75. 
39Dripps, supra note J 5. at 1786. 
40Sexual imposition through usc of force would be analogous to robbery, and sexual 
imposition without the victim's consent would be analogous to theft. /d. at 1800. Whi le 
Dripps directly states this analogy, the analogy is not new. Saint Thomas Aquinas u~ed the 
same analogy. See il?fra note 325. 
41 Dripps, supra note 15, at 1796. 
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Dripps proposes two classifications of sexual offenses. Sexual acts committed 
through use of force are classified as "Sexually Motivated Assault.''42 Sexual acts 
committed against the will of the victim but without physical force are classified as 
"Sexual Expropriation.'"'.! Sexually Motivated Assault is viewed as a violation of 
"the interest in freedom fi·om violence" and Sexual Expropriation is a violation of 
sexual autonomy.44 
Sexually Motivated Assault and Sexual Expropriation carry different levels of 
punishment. Sexually Motivated Assault would be punished as a serious felony.45 
Sexual Expropriation would be punished as a serious misdemeanor or a minor 
felony.46 The levels of punishment assigned to the offenses reflect Dripps' 
presupposition that "the interest in unwanted sex is less important than the interest in 
freedom from violence.'"'7 Dripps goes as far as saying that "whether measured by 
42/d at 1797. Professor Dripps suggests the following model language for a violation of 
''Sexually Motivated Assault'': 
(I) For purposes of this section, "sexual act" means any act of coitus. fellatio, 
cunnilingus. buggery, or any insertion of an object into the vagina or the anus. 
(2) Whoever purposely or knowingly gives another person cause to fear physical 
injury, or purposely or knowingly inflicts physical injury on another person, or 
purposely or knowingly overpowers another's physical resistance, for the purpose of 
causing any person to engage in a sexual act, is guilty of Sexually Motivated Assault. 
Sexually Motivated Assault is subject to the same sentence as aggravated assault. 
(3) Whoever purposely or knowingly gives another person reasonable cause to fear 
death, injury from a deadly weapon, dismemberment or disfigurement, or who 
purposely or knowingly injures another with a deadly weapon, dismembers, or 
disfigures another person. for the purpose of causing any person to engage in a sexual 
act with any other person. commits Aggravated Sexually Motivated Assault. 
Aggravated Sexually Motivated Assault is ~ubject to the same sentence previously 
applicable to rape. 
!d. app. at 1807. 
4
"/d. at 1799. Professor Dripps suggests the tollowing model language for a violation of 
"Sexual Expropriation'': 
(I) For purposes of this section, ''sexual act" has the same meaning as for the 
purposes of Sexually Motivated Assault. 
(2) Whoever purposely or knowingly commits any sexual act with or upon any person 
A. known by the actor to have expressed the refusal to engage in that act, 
without subsequently expressly revoking that refusal: or 
B. believed by the actor to have refrained from expressing refusal because the 
actor has committed Sexually Motivated Assau It or Aggravated Sexually 
Motivated Assault: or 
C. known by the actor to be unconscious. physically helpless, mentally 
incompetent, or otherwise unable to express the refusal to engage in that act, 
commits Sexual Expropriation. Sexual Expropriation is punishable by a 
maximum prison sentence of one year and one day. 
!d. app. at 1807. 
•
4/d. at 1803. 
45/d. at 1797. 
46/d. at 1804. 
nld. 
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the welfare or by the dignity of the victim, as a general matter unwanted sex is not as 
bad as violence."4R Therefore, the penalties reflect the "relative seriousness" of the 
offenses.49 
Ill. CRITICISM OF THE COMMODITY APPROACH 
Dripps' proposed system is not without its critics. Most criticisms stem from his 
use of commodity theory to provide a basis for sexual autonomy. Robin West wrote 
Legitimating the lllegitimate: A Comment on Beyond Rape in direct response to 
Professor Dripps.50 She contends that his system does not adequately address sex 
obtained through fraud and that commodity theory legitimizes sexual transactions in 
what Dripps calls "complex relationships" (e.g. sex within a marriage based on 
desire for financial security). 51 
Dripps' theory is also susceptible to criticism based on the low punishment he 
assigns to crimes of "Sexual Expropriation" (sex offenses which violate the will of 
the victim).52 The assignment of a minor punishment is premised on the 
presupposition that the physical force sometimes used to effectuate sexual offenses 
causes more harm than merely violating the victim's will.53 However, evidence can 
be offered which tends to refute this premise. 
The physical injuries associated with sexual offenses may be treated, "while 
psychological injuries, which may be even deeper, are ignored[.]"54 In addition to 
the physical effects of these offenses, the victims are more likely to suffer from 
depression, to suffer from post traumatic stress disorder, to abuse a lcohol, to abuse 
drugs, and are four times more likely to contemplate suicide. 55 
481d. at 180 I. 
49/d. at 1804. 
50Robin L. West, Legitimating the Illegitimate: A Comment on Beyond Rape, 93 CoLUM. 
L. REV. 1442 (1993). 
51 1d. at 1442-43. See also, Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of 
Sexual Conduct, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 777. 835-43 ( 1988) (arguing for a theory of mutuality 
under which both of the sexual participants' consent would be judged on the basis of whether 
they would have chosen to initiate the sexual encounter); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-
inalienability, lOO 1-iARv. L. REv. 1849, 1921-25 ( 1987) (arguing commodity theory trivializes 
personal autonomy by treating it as property). 
52 See Dripps, supra note 15, at 1807 (where a maximum penalty of one year and one day 
imprisonment is assigned to the oftimse of Sexual Expropriation). 
5.\/d. at 1799 (''Because I believe that violence is more dangerous and more culpable than 
an unwelcome sex act, I propose a modest penalty for expropriation[.]"). Based on the length 
of sentence terms recommended for Sexually Motivated Assault compared with Sexual 
Expropriation, Professor Dripps appears to believe that "violence" is significantly more 
culpable than unwelcome sex. The author struggles with conceptualizing how the unwanted 
physical intrusion into another's body is not a violent act itself. 
54 Abby L. Wilkerson, "Her Body Her Own Worst Enemy": The Medicalization of Violence 
Against Women, in VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: PHJLOSOPIIICAL PERSPECTIVES 123 , 134 
(Stanley G. French et al. eds., 1998). 
55RAINN, Who Are the Victims?, http://www.rainn.org/get-information/statistics/sexual-
assault-victims (last visited Mar. 8, 2009). 
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Some of these psychological injuries are described in tem1s of '"the undoing of 
the self,' an ' inability to feel at home in the world,' a 'paradox of practical reason: 1 
can't go on. I must go on ,' and 'a radical undem1ining of trust. "'56 Psychological 
injuries are present regardless of whether violent physical force was used to 
perpetrate the offence. 57 
These psychological injuries are tied to the significance of the sexual act. Joan 
McGregor has explained that "[s]ex, sexuality, our bodies and control over them are 
central to who we are."58 She further states that "[r]ape is such a serious violation 
because it transgresses this central zone for our identity, it exposes us and makes us a 
tool or thing for someone else's sexual ends."59 
IV. T ESTING IN THE LABORATORY OF JUDICIAL DEBATE 
Rather than theoretically evaluating Professor Dripps' system in terms of 
hypothetical scenarios,60 this Note will evaluate his system through the laboratory of 
judicial debate. The 2007 circuit split illustrates Dripps' model in action.61 The 
central issue in the split was whether non-consensual sex offenses not perpetuated by 
physical force should receive the same sentence enhancement as sexual offenses 
committed using physical force. This issue arose out of the application of the 2007 
version of§ 2L1.2 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. In order to properly frame the 
issue, it is necessary to provide a brief description of the Guidelines generally and of 
the particular section specifically. 
A. Background of the Guidelines 
In 1985, the Federal Sentencing Commission. an independent body within the 
judicial branch, was formed under the authority of the Sentencing Reform Act of 
19846 1 The Commission drafted the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to provide a 
56Wilkerson, supra note 54, at 123. 
57 Patricia A. Frazier & Lisa M. Seales, Acquaintance Rape is Real Rape, in RESEARCH I 'G 
SEXUAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: METHODOLOGICAL AND PERSONAL PERSPECTIVES, 54, 63 
(Martin D. Schwartz ed., 1997) (stating that ''the overall trend is that stranger and 
acquaintance rape victims do not differ in terms of postrape distress and symptomatology"; 
furthem1ore , there are '·no differences between women who define their experience as rape 
and women who did not," when lack of violent force is considered as the distinguishing 
characteristic). 
58 McGREGOR, supra note 18, at 221. 
59 !d. at 222. 
60Dripps develops his theory using atypical hypothetical situations including the bedroom 
activities of inebriated husbands and wives, chance encounters between men at a gay 
bathhouse, and a "gentleman" who stealthily engages in intercourse with an unconscious 
victim but is sure to practice safe sex and do absolutely no physical harm. Dripps, supra note 
15, at 1788-89. 
61The circuit split was identified in United States v. Romero-Hernandez, 505 F.3d I 082, 
I 087 (I Oth Cir. 2007). 
62Lisa M. Segheni & Alison M. Smith, CRS Report for Congress, Federal Semencing 
Guidelines: Background, Legal Analysis. and Policy Options 13, June 30, 2007. available at 
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32766.pdf. 
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basis for determining the sentences for federal criminal violations.6' The Guidelines 
were intended to provide a method of sentencing that would promote uniformity and 
fairness while simultaneously providing an effective deterrent of crime.(..t 
The goal of the Guidelines is to provide a system of determinate sentences where 
the length of the sentence serYcd would be detennined at the time the sentence was 
imposed. t•5 
The Guidelines determine ~entences by considering two factors: (I) the conduct 
associated with the offense (which detennines the ''offense level"), and (2) the 
defendant's criminal history (the "criminal history category"). Based on these two 
fi\ctors, the Guidelines provide a sentencing range (in months) for the court to 
impose on the particular offense.!)(· 
B. Description of§ 2Ll .2 
The specific section of the Guidelines at issue in the 2007 circuit spilt is§ 2LI.2 
Unlawfully Entering or Remaining in the United States.~7 The purpose of this 
section's sentencing enhancement is to punish persons previously deported after 
committing a crime who illegally ret!ntcr the United States.68 This enhancement 
renects Congress' view ·'that the !louting of American immigration laws is a far 
graver matter where the defendant's prior deportation was for committing a serious 
crime than where deportation was for a technical violation of the immigration 
laws.'·<>Y This section of the Guiddines provides the following: 
"'Impli<·utions I!{ the Booker/Fanfan Decisions .fbr the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: 
Hearing Before the H. Judiciary Suhcvmm. on Crime. Terrorism. and Homeland Security. 
I 09th Cong. (2005) {hcn:-inatter Hearings] (statement of the Honorable Christopher A. Wray, 
Assistant Att 'y Gen., Criminal Division U.S. Department of Justice). 
''
4 /J. Senator Patrick Leahy was quoted as describing the time before the use of the 
Fcdcral Sentencing Guidel ine!> as "the bad old days of fully indeterminate sentencing when 
improper factors such as race, geography and the predilections of the sentencing judge could 
drastically affect a defendant's sentence:· ld at 8-9. 
65/d. 
00As a result of the Supreme Court decision Unired Stares v. Booker in 2005. the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidel ines are now considered advisory. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). What exactly the 
advisory nature of the Guidelines means is uncertain. Segetti, supra note 60, at 8-10. 
However. the current rule is that sentences must be reasonable. The Justice Department 
t:onsidcr:s the Guidelines to he "presumptively reasonable.'' Hearings. supra note 63. Even in 
an advisory capacity, the Guidelines remain relevant as ''fj]udges have said that they intend to 
stick with the Guidelines, absent sornc:thing extraordinary:· Lisa Siegel, Defense AITorneys 
Put on Norice Post-Booker Appeals Fraughr with Ri.~k. CoNN. L. TRIB., Feb. 21. 2005, at I. 
available at http://www.law.com/jsp/PubArticle.jsp?id=900005423978. 
"'U.S Sentencing Guidelines ~ 2LI.2 (2007). The immigration aspect of this Guideline is 
not related to the cin:uit split. The Sentencing Guidelines were amended in November 2008, 
highlighted in.fi"a Part VII. 
uxSigmund G. Popko. Through rhe l.ooking Glass: Rc:flecling on Prior Crimes u.f Violence, 
FED. So .. rr·c; REP .. .2005 WL 161 !Q33. *3 (Feb. 2005). 
MUnited States v. Luna-Madd laga. 315 F.3d 1224. 1227 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting United 
States v. Campbell. 967 F.2d 20, 24 (2d Cir. 1992)). 
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol57/iss2/9
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(a) Base Offense Level: 8 
(b) Specific Offense Characteristic 
(I) Apply the Greatest: If the defendant previously was 
deported, or unlawfully remained in the United States, after-
(A) a conviction for a felony that is (i) a drug 
trafficking offense for which the sentence imposed 
exceeded 13 months; (ii) a crime of violence; (iii) a 
firearms offense; (iv) a child pornography offense; 
(v) a national security or terrorism offense; (vi) a 
human trafficking offense; or (vii) an alien 
smuggling offense, increase by 16 levels; 
(B) a conviction for a felony drug trafficking offense 
for which the sentence imposed was 13 months or 
less, increase by 12 levels; 
(C) a conviction for an aggravated felony , increase 
by 8 levels; 
(D) a conviction for any other felony, increase by 4 
levels; or 
(E) three or more convictions for misdemeanors that 
are crimes of violence or drug trafficking offenses, 
increase by 4 levels.70 
In addition, the pertinent part ofthe Application Notes provides: 
(iii) 'Crime of violence' means any of the following: Murder, 
manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, forcible sex offenses, 
statutory rape, sexual abuse of a minor, robbery, arson, extortion, 
extortionate extension of credit, burglary of a dwelling, or any offense 
under federal , state, or local law that has as an element the use, 
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of 
another.71 
319 
Under this definition felonies are "crimes of violence" if they are specifically 
enumerated in the Note (the "enumerated approach") or if the felony had "as an 
70U.S SENTENCING GUIDELINES§ 2Ll.2 (2007). 
71U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2LI.2, Application Notes (2007) (emphasis 
added). Courts look to the Application Notes of the Sentencing Guidelines to determine how 
to define particular terms used in the Guidelines and to decipher the intent of the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission. 
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element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person 
of another" (the •·elemental approach").72 
When determining ir a particular offense meets the definition of "crime of 
violence," courts apply what is called a "categorical" analysis. The Supreme Court 
provided the framework of this analysis in Taylor v. United States.13 In Taylor, the 
Court held that courts must use "a f·onnal categorical approach, looking only to the 
statutory definitions of the prior offenses. and not to the particular facts underlying 
those convictions."7• However, under both Taylor and subsequently Shepard v. 
United States. the Court stated that .. the statutory definition, charging document, 
written plea agreement. transcript of plea colloquy, and any explicit tactual finding 
by the trial judge to which the defendant assented" may be used to determine which 
section of a statute the defendant violated.75 In some cases, these documents enable 
the court to determine what specific section of a broad statute the defendant 
violated.7~ 
C. A FrameworkjiJr Analysis 
The 2007 circuit split over determining how non-consensual sex offenses fit into 
this Guideline provides an excellent framework for analyzing Dripps' theory in 
practice. Some courts in the split created a system similar to Professor Dripps' 
proposal when deciding whether non-consensual sex can be considered "forcible" 
and thus receive the same sentencing enhancement as sexual offenses perpetuated 
through use of physical torce under § 2L 1.2 of the Guidelines. Those courts that 
answered "no" to this question gave a lesser enhancement for non-consensual sex 
offenses; therefore, their application of the Sentencing Guideline mirrored that of 
Dripps' proposal.77 Under both, sexual offenses committed through use of physical 
force ("Sexually Motivated Assault") are more heavily penalized than non-
consensual sex offenses ("Sexual Expropriation"). 
The debate between the circuits serves as an ideal means of testing the principles 
inherent in Dripps' system for several reasons. First, the courts' application of the 
Guidelines only involved assigning a sentencing value tor the prior sexual offense.n 
The offenses had previously been adjudicated so there were no legal questions 
regarding establishing lack of consent. Second, since the prior sexual offenses had 
already been proven. there were no evidentiary issues.79 Finally, the circuit split 
illustrated a very limited application of Dripps' proposal, specifically how the courts 
view force and violations of the will.~0 
72Popko, supra note 68, at *2 . 
73495 u.s. 575 (1990). 
; 4 !d. at 600. 
75544 u.s. 13, 16 (2005). 
7('United States v. Romero-Hemandez. 505 F.3d I 082, I 085 (1Oth Cir. 2007). 
'
7 See supra notes 42-43. 
7~Romero-Hernandt>::, 505 F.3d at 1085-86. 
7')/d. 
RoThe defendants in these cases were sentenced under a variety of statutes at the state 
level. The purpose of this analysis is not to comment on any shortcoming of the state 
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V . SPLIT OVER FORCE 
The c ircuit split inc luded the Third, Fifth. Ninth, and Tenth Circuits.R1 The issue 
dividing the circuits, while arising out of the application of§ 2L 1.2 of the Sentencing 
Guidelines, was not d irectly related to immigration. The issue that divided the courts 
was whether a non-consensual sex offense should qualify as a "crime of violence" 
under the Guideline.82 The Guidel ine imposed a more severe sentencing 
enhancement on offenses which qualify as a "crime of violence" than otTenses which 
did not.83 
A. The Fissure: United States v. Sarmiento-Funes 
On June 2 1, 2004. the Fifth Circuit held that a sexual crime based on the victim's 
lack of consent was not a "crime of violence" under the Sentencing Guidelines.x~ 
This decision provided the foundation for the circuit split identified by the Tenth 
Circuit in United States v. Rumero-Hernandez.85 The court 's decision provided a 
basis for analyzing sexual crimes in terms of the force used to commit them rather 
that in tem1s of the victim 's lack of consent.86 In that respect, the court's decision 
was similar to Dripps' proposed system of defining the severity of sexual offenses in 
terms of the force used to commit them.s' 
Jose Sanniento-Funes, a citizen of Honduras, pled guilty to illegal reent1y into 
the United States after previously committing a felony.A~ Prior to Mr. Sarmiento-
Funes' illegal reentry, he had been convicted in Missouri for "sexual assault" and 
was subsequently deported.~~ Missouri law defined "sexual assault" as: "sexual 
sentencing schemes. but rather to i~ol ate and examine the value judgment that must be made 
when confronting violations of the wi ll. 
81 Romero-Hernandez, 505 F.3d at 1087 (identifying the circuits in the split). 
82 U.S SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL§ 2L 1.2(b)(A)(ii) (2007). 
~3 Jd 
84 United States v. Sarmiento-Funes, 374 F.3d 336, 344-45 (5th Cir. 2004). 
85 Romero-Hernandez. 505 F.3d at I 086. Each case in this circuit spl it references 
Sarmiento-Funes. See United States v. Remoi. 404 F.3d 789. 796 (3d Cir. 2005): United 
States v. Beltran-Munguia. 489 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Gomez-
Gomez, 493 F.3d 562. 564 (5th Cir. 2007): Romero-Hemandez, 505 F.3d at 10R6 (the court 
does not reference Sarmiemo-Funes by name but specifically analyzes and refutes the 
definition of"forcible" used by the Fifth Circuit in Sarmiemo-Funes). 
86Sarmienro-Fzmes, 374 F.3d il l 339. 
87Dripps, supra note 15. at 1797. 
88Sarmienro-Funes, 374 F.3d at 338. 
89/d. The specitic facts surrounding Mr. Sarmiento-Funes· conviction are not known or 
relevant. The record in this case tracked the language of the state statute and did not provide 
specitic detai ls. Id at 33R n.l. Although Jhe police report did include more detai l. such detail 
may not be used in determining whether Mr. Sarmiento-Funes' conviction amounts 10 a 
"crime of violence" under the Sentencing Guidelines. Under the categorical approach 
prescribed by Taylor. such information must be excluded from analysis. /d. 
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intercourse with another person knowing that he does so without that person's 
consent.'"90 
Mr. Sarmiento-Funes argued that his offense should not be considered a forcible 
crime.91 He asserted that Missouri had a different section of the code that dealt with 
"forcible rape."92 He argued that the separation of "forcible rape" and "sexual 
assau lt" under two distinct sections of the Missouri crim inal code indicated that 
sexual assault could be committed without the use of force.93 The district court 
rejected this argument, stating that the sexual assault was committed using force-
the force of penetratioo .94 As a result, the district court sentenced him to four years 
in jail , which "included a sixteen- level enhancement based on a previous conviction 
for a 'crime of violence' within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 2Ll.2 cmt. n.l (B)(ii) 
(2002). '"95 
On appeal, Mr. Sarmiento-Funes reiterated his argument to the circuit court.% 
Whether the Missouri sexual assault law inherently involves the use of force was the 
issue before the court.<>7 In analyzing this issue, the court considered whether sexual 
assau lt itself was forcible, as well as whether the act of penetration without the 
consent of the victim was sufficient to qualify a sexual offense as being forcible.9~ 
Based on its analysis of these questions, as discussed below, the court overruled the 
district court's decision, holding that Mr. Sarmiento-Funes ' offense was not a "crime 
of violence" because it did not meet the definition of '·forcible."Q9 
The district court had enhanced Mr. Sarmiento-Funes' sentences under the 2002 
Sentencing Guidelines. 100 Under the 2002 Guidelines, "crime of violence" was 
defined as: 
90/d. at 338 (quoting Mo. A NN. STAT.§ 566.040(1) (We~ t 1999)). 
') 'lei. 
~2Jd. Mr. Sarmiento-Funes was referring to section 566.030 of the Missouri code, which 
outlaws rape accomplished through forcible compulsion. Mo. ANN. STAT. (West 1999). 
Forcible compulsion is "[p)hysical force that overcomes reasonable resistance; or . . [a] 
threat. express or implied, that places a person in reasonable fear of death. serious physical 
injury or kidnapping of such person or another person .... " Sarmiento-Funes, 374 F.3d at 
339 n.2 (quoting Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 556.061(12) (West 1999)). It is interesting to note the 
similarities between the Missouri statute and Professor Dripps' proposed system for 
sentencing sexual offenses. See sources cited supra notes 42-43. The language of both 
separates offenses involving the extrinsic use of physical force from offenses that involve 
violation of the victim's will. 
93Sarmienro-Funes, 347 F.3d at 338. 
q4/d. 
95/d. (emphasis omitted). 
'}6/d. 
~7/d. at 339. 
9R/d. 
<>9/d. at 344-45. 
100Jd. at 338. 
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(I) means an offense under federal, state or local law that has as an 
element the use, attempted use, or threatened usc of physical force against 
the person or another; and 
(II ) includes murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, 
forcible sex offenses (including sexual abuse of a minor), robbery. arson, 
extortion, extortionate extension of credit, and burglary of a dwelling. 10 1 
Since the district court found that sexual assault was "forcible" according to the 
elements of the Missouri statute, the court enhanced Mr. Sarmiento-Funes' sentence 
using part I of the Sentencing Guideline's definition of"crime ofviolence." 102 On de 
novo review, the circuit court examined both the first and second part of the 
Guideline 's definition of"crime of violence."103 
The circuit court started by analyzing Mr. Sarmiento-Funes· offense under 11rst 
part of the Guideline's definition of "violent crime," the elemental approach. 104 
Under this analysis, the court considered whether sexual assault involved the use or 
threatened use of force as one of its elements. 105 The court immediately agreed with 
Mr. Sanniento-Funes that ''the Missouri sexual assault statute does not require force 
in the same sense as does a traditional forcible rape statute ... [in that it] does not 
require that physical violence, coercion, or threats accompany the sex act. .. w. 
However, the district court had concluded that, for purposes of the Sentencing 
Guidelines, sexual assault could be deemed "forcible" regardless of whether the 
offense involved the use of "physical violence, forcible compulsion, or threats."1n1 
Therefore, the circuit court had to detennine what constituted "force" under the 
Guidelines. 108 
The government argued that since the sexual assault under Missollli law required 
sexual intercourse,'09 physical penetration and the force inherent in it1w were 
"
11 See id. (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 2LI .2 cmt. n.l (B)(ii) (2002)). It 
should be noted that the sentencing guidelines have subsequently been amended. The 2007 
version of the Guidelines reverses the order of the two methods of analysis- the enumerated 
offenses are listed first followed by the elemental approach. In addition, "sexual abuse of a 
minor" and "statutory rape' ' have been independently added to the enumerated list ("forcible 
sex offenses" now stands alone). U.S. SENTENCING GUIOEUNES MANl!AL § 2LI.2 (2007). 
This language was substantially changed in the 2008 amendment w the Guidelines and will be 
highlighted infra Part VII. 
102United States v. Sarmiento-Funes, 374 F.3d 336,338 (5th Cir. 2004). 
103/d. 
104/d. at 339. 
105Jd. at 339-42. 
106Jd. at 339. 
107/d. The district court ruled that the fact that Missouri had two statutes, one for forcible 
rape and one for sexual assault, did not mean that sexual assault was not forcible. !d. 
108/d at 339 n.4. That question depended on the meaning of the phrase .. use of physical 
force" in the Sentencing Guidelines. 
109Sexual intercourse was defined in tenns of penetration. Mo. ANN. ST,\T. § 556.0 I 0( 4) 
(West 1999) (defining sexual intercourse as "any penetration, however slight"). 
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required elements of sexual assault. 111 The circuit court agreed that there is force 
inherent in penetration; however, in the court's view it is same force that 
accompanies any touching of another person.111 The court stated that it could not 
rule "that the force of penetration per se amounts to 'the use of force' to which the 
Sentencing Guidelines refer."113 The court had already rejected defining penetration 
as "forcible per se" in United States v. Houston. 114 
The government argued that the Missouri sexual assault statute did not 
criminalize the act of penetration; the statute criminalized the act of penetration 
without the victim's consent. 115 According to the government's argument, 
penetration with the lack of the victim's consent makes the act forceful."'' Once 
again, the court relied on the holding in Houston to reject the government' s 
argument. 117 
Based on the presupposition that use of force is not present where there is 
consent-in-fact, 118 the court reexamined the language of the MissoUJi statute.119 The 
Missouri statute served as a prohibition on non-consensual intercourse. 120 However, 
as defined by the statute, lack of consent included instances when consent-in-fact 
110See United States v. Yanez-Saucedo, 295 F.3d 991,995-96 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that 
force is inherent in penetration such that defendant's prior offense could be considered rape); 
Missouri v. Niederstadt, 66 S.W.3d 12, 15 (Mo. 2002) (holding penetration is a type of force). 
111 United States v. Sarmiento-Fm1es, 374 F.3d 336, 339 (5th Cir. 2004). 
112/d. at340. Such touching "involves 'force' in a physics or engineering sense." Jd 
113 {d. 
1 1 ~364 F .3d 243, 246 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that a sex crime did not involve the "use of 
force" though physical penetration was present). In United SrCifes v. Housron, the court 
considered the application of the Sentencing Guidelines to a defendant previously convicted of 
statutory rape. The court held that the offense of statutory rape was not "forcible" because, 
while the sexual act was illegal, the act was consensual. /d. at 246. The Sarmiento-Funes 
court stared that the Housron holding was in regards to a different provision of the Guidelines 
(U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 4B l.2(a)( I)), however, the ·'use of force" language employed 
there was identical to that employed in the Guideline's provision for illegal reentry into the 
United States under § 2L 1.2 cmt. n. l (B)(ii)(l). Sarmienro-Funes, 374 F.3d at 340 n.5. The 
coun in Sarmiemo-Funes acknowledged that the holding in Houston may seem strange since 
the basis of culpability under statutory rape is the notion that the minor is incapable of giving 
valid consent. !d. at 341. However, the court noted that Houston distinguished two types of 
consent-consent-in-fact and consent-in-law. /d. In the case of statutory rape, the minor may 
consent-in-fact to the sexual act while being incapable of consent-in-law. !d. The coun 
concluded that ·'[tjhe rule that emerges from Houston, therefore, is that intercourse does not 
involve the use of force when it is accompanied by consent-in-fact.'' !d. 
115Sarmiento-Funes, 374 F.3d at 340. 
116/d. 
117/d. 
118See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
119/d. 
120/d. 
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was present, but when consent-in-law was deemed to be lacking. 121 Based on the 
ruling of Houston , force cannot exist in the presence of consent-in-fact, therefore, the 
Sarmiento-Funes court held that the Missouri statute did not "require the use of 
physical force against the victim, [and] the statute therefore does not have, as an 
element, the use of physical force against the person of another.'' 122 
The district court had decided that Mr. Sarmiento-Funes' offense was a "crime of 
violence" using the first part of the definition in the Guideline. 123 In the alternative, 
on appeal the government argued that sexual assault was a "crime of violence" under 
the Guideline's second approach to defining "crime of violence" because sexual 
assault constituted a "forcible sex offense."114 To decide if sexual assault was a 
"crime of violence" under the second definition, the court had to define the phrase 
"forcible sex offense.''125 The 2007 Sentencing Guidelines did not define " forcible 
sex offense.''126 Instead. the court looked to the common meaning of the phrase, 
121 United States v. Sarmiento-Funes, 374 F.3d 336. 340-41 (5th Cir. 2004). The Missouri 
statute defined consent as the following: 
Consent or lack of consent may be expressed or implied. Assent [consent-in-fact] 
does not constitute consent if: 
(a) It is given by a person who lacks the mental capacity to authorize the conduct 
charged to constitute the offense and such mental incapacity is manifest or known tt) 
the actor; or 
(b) It is given by a person who by reason of youth, mental disease or defect, or 
intoxication, is manifestly unable or known by the actor to be unable to make a 
reasonable judgment as to the nature or harmfulness of the conduct charged to 
constitute the offense; or 
(c) ll is induced by force, duress or deception[.] 
/d. at n.6 (citing Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.030( 1) (2007)). 
122Sarmiento-Funes, 374 F.3d at 341. The dissent argued that under the language of the 
Missouri statute, the victim is not able to give consent-in-fact. !d. at 346 (Garza. J.. 
dissenting). The dissent argued that the victim does not have the capacity to judge the 
ramifications of his or her actions and, therefore, is incapable of any form of consent, consent-
in-fact or consent-in-law. /d. at 346-47. However, this argument is not very compelling in 
light of Houston. One of the "incapacities' ' listed by the statute is "youth." See sources cited 
supra note 121. "Youth'' is the very incapacity present for statutory rape, but Houston held 
that the victim can give consent-in-fact. United States v. Houston, 364 F.3d 243, 246-47 (5th 
Cir. 2004). Unfortunately, the dissent never addressed this issue. 
123Sarmiento-Funes, 374 F.3d at 342. 
124/d. 
125/d. 
126/d. at 343. In addition. neither of the parties in the case offered their own definition of 
the phrase. /d. The government did try to analogize to other sections of the Sentencing 
Guidelines that used the phrase "forcible sex offense'' to illustrate that the phrase did not 
require actual force. The court summarized the government's argument as: "(I) that certain 
' sexual abuse crimes' are 'crimes of violence,' and (2) that ' forcible sex ofTen5es' are also 
'crimes of violence. '" /d. Therefore, sexual ahuse crimes are torcible sex otTenses. !d. A 
simple Venn diagram illustrates the fallacy in this argument. Just because the category of 
"crimes of violence" contains the subset of "sexual abuse crimes" and the subset of " forcible 
sex offenses" does not make the two subsets equivalents. The court found the government's 
analogy to be faulty. !d. Therefore, in order to complete its analysis, the court determined its 
own definition of"forcible sex offense." Jd. at344. Because "(r]elatively few appellate cases 
17Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2009
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relying upon the dictionary for the detinition. 127 Using Black's Law DictionaJy, the 
court defined ·'forcible" as "effected by force or threat of force against opposition or 
resistance."128 Based on this definition, the court concluded that •'the adjective 
'forcible' centrally denotes a species of force that either approximates the concept of 
forcible compulsion or, at least, does not embrace some of the assented-to-but-not-
consented-to conduct at issue here."':~ 
Based on the assumption that ''forcible" denotes some use of physical 
compulsion, the court determined the conviction for sexual assault under the 
Missouri statute did not qualify as a "forcible sex offense" under the Guidelines. 130 
As a result, Mr. Sarmiento-Funes' offense could not be defined as a "crime of 
violence" under either part of the Sentencing Guidelines definition, and the district 
court's sixteen-level sentence enhancement was held to be improper. 131 
While the holding of the court may seem definitive, a footnote in the court's 
decision indicates that it was not. Footnote eight states that the court's decision was 
based upon the "distinction between consent-in-fact and consent-in-law."132 The 
court left open the possibility that in cases where there is no consent-in-fact, there 
could be "force" for the sake of the Sentencing Guidelines without the use of 
extrinsic force or threats. 133 This was the very issue the Third Circuit confronted in 
United States v. Remoi, a case involving a physically helpless victim. 134 
B. Non-Consensual Sex Is Forcible: United States v. Remoi 
In 2004, the Third Circuit took a step away from detining "forcible sex offenses" 
solely in terms of a perpetrator overcoming a victim's resistance. 1 3~ The sexual 
offense in this case was committed against a physically helpless victim. 136 To 
Dripps, sex with a physically helpless victim should "uncontroversial(ly]" be 
considered Sexual Expropriation and result in a modest penalty. 137 The Third Circuit 
ha(d] discussed the meaning of 'torcible sex offenses' for Guidelines purposes." the court did 
not rely on prior cases to define the phrase. !d 
127/d 
128/d. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 657 (7th ed. 1999)). 
129Sarmiento-Fzmes, 374 F.3d at 344-45. The court failed to define force. ll is apparent 
from the phrase "forcible sex offense" that "force" will be a component of such a crime. 
However, what is force? The court assumes that "force" is to be defined in tenns of physical 
compulsion. !d. at 345. Since the court tailed to define "force," the issue remained 
unresolved. 
130/d. 
131/d. 
132/d. at 341 n.8. 
133/d. 
134United States v. Remoi. 404 F.3d 789,791 (3d Cir. 2004). 
LIS ld at 793-95. 
134/d. at 791. 
137Dripps, supra note 15, at 1800. 
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came to the opposite conclusion, holding that non-consensual sex imposed on a 
helpless victim constitutes a .. crime ofviolence."m 
The case provided an opportunity for the Third Circuit to rule on the issue 
identified by the Fifth Circuit in Sarmiento-Funes- the possibility that ·'force" under 
the Sentencing Guidelines could mean more than the physical compulsion normally 
associated with rape. 13'' The court shifted from defining .. force'' through the 
perspective of a perpetrator's physical acts to a focus on the victim and a defi nition 
of force centered on lack of consent. 1• 0 By defining "force" in terms of the violation 
of consent, the court ruled that sexual offenses committed against physically helpless 
victims constitute "forcible sex offenses" and are .. crimes of violence" under§ 2L 1.2 
or the Sentencing Guidelines.'•' 
In Remoi, the court applied the Sentencing Guidelines to a defendant who had 
committed a sexual crime against a physically helpless victim. 14~ Mr. Remoi argued 
that his crime could not be a "forcible sexual offense" since no force is requ ired to 
overcome a physically incapacitated person.'"·' The court disagreed and found that 
"penetration against a physically helpless, mentally defective or mentally 
incapacitated victim ... constitutes a • forcible sexual offense' under section 2L 1.2" 
of the Sentencing Guidelines. '~ 
In order to reach the conclusion that "forcible" means more than physical 
compulsion, the court analogized sexual crimes against helpless victims to sexual 
crimes against minors. 145 The court started by rejecting Mr. Remoi's assertion that 
the Guideline required the force used in the crime to be physical. 14n The court noted 
that the first part of the definition of ·'crime of violence" (the elemental approach). 
defined "crime of violence·· in tem1s of physical force, while the second part of the 
definition, the list of enumerated crimes (specifically "forcible sex offense"), omits 
·' the antecedent modifier ·physical. "'147 Because the omission was contained within 
13
' Remoi, 404 F.3d ill 796. 
IWUnited States v. Sarmiento-Funes, 374 F.3d 336, 341 n.8 (leaving the issue of"use of 
force" as dcr.ned by the Guidelines open under certain circumstances). 
1
•
11Remoi. 404 F.3d at 796. 
141/d. at 795. 
1421d. at 793. Mr. Remoi had been convicted under a New Jersey statute which provided: 
An actor is guilty of sexual assault if he commits an act of sexual penetration with 
another person under any one of the following circumstances: (I) The actor uses 
physical force or coercion. but the victim does not sustain severe personal injury: (2) 
The victim is one whom the actor knew or should have known was physically 
helpless, mentally defective or mentally incapacitated .... 
N.J. STAT. ANI\. § 2C: 14-2c (West 1990) (quoted in Remoi. 404 f.Jd at 793). 
14
'Remoi, 404 F.3d at 794. 
'""ld. at 795 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
14$/d. 
1
•
61d. at 794. 
147/d. Note that the application note was subsequently amended; the two sections have 
been reversed. See U.S. SENTENCING G UIDEUNCS MANUAL§ 2LI.2, app. n. I(B)(iii) (2007). 
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the text of the same advisory note, the court concluded that the Sentencing 
Commission intended "crime of violence" to be defined to include more than just 
offenses involving physical force. 148 
The court continued by pointing out that the Sentencing Guidelines included 
·'sexual abuse of a minor" as a ' 'forcible sex offense."149 The basis for this inclusion 
is that children are naturally weaker and more susceptible to coercion by adults. 150 
Therefore, regardless of consent or lack of physical resistance, sexual crimes against 
minors are presumed forcible .'51 The court reasoned that similarly, a physically 
incapacitated or mentally handicapped victim is unable to give consent. The 
vulnerability of such victims renders them in a chi ld-like state.'52 Therefore, the 
sexual penetration of an incapacitated, helpless victim should be deemed forcible. 153 
Based on the analogy to sexual abuse of a minor, the court equated force with 
lack of consent. 154 The court stated, " If a 'forcible' sexual offense is not associated 
with physical compulsion, it must therefore mean a sexual act that is committed 
against the victim's will or consent."155 However, the court limited the scope of this 
view of force to apply specifically to incapacitated victims in an effort to reconcile 
its position with the position that the Fifth Circuit had taken in United States v. 
Sarmiento-Funes.15f> In Sarmienlo-Funes, the Fifth Circuit held that "forcible sex 
offense" did not include intercourse without consent. 157 There the court stated that 
"it seems that the adjective 'forcible· centrally denotes a species of force that . 
approximates the concept of forcible compulsion."158 
14KRemoi. 404 F.3d at 794. 
149fd. at 795. The Sentencing Guidelines have been subsequently amended. The 
enumerated list of crimes of violence now specifically includes ·'sexual abuse of a minor" and 
''statutory rape.'' U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANIJAL § 2L 1.2 cml. n. l(B)(iii) (2007). 
150Remoi, 404 F.3d at 795. 
151/d. 
151/d. 
15J/d. In using this analogy, the Third Circuit attempted to give its decision more weight 
with the other circuits by reconciling its decision with the Fitlh Circuit's decision in 
Sam1iento-Funes. /d. at 796. The court noted that its broad interpretation of "forcible sex 
offense" was consistent with the position taken by circuits reviewing sexual crimes committed 
against minors. The court noted that the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth 
Circuits had all recognized that "sexual abuse of a minor- forcible or not--<:onstitutes a crime 
of violence.'' ld. (intemal quotation marks omitted) (citing United States v. Rayo-Valdcz. 302 
F.3d 314. 316, 318-19 (5th Cir. 2002)); United States v. Pereira-Salmeron, 337 F.3d 1 148, 
1152 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Vargas-Gamica, 332 F.3d 471, 473-74 (7th Cir. 2003); 
United States v. Gomez-Hernandez, 300 F.3d 974. 979 (8th Cir. 2002): United States v. 
Pierce. 278 F.3d 282,290-91 (4th Cir. 2002); United StaLes v. Coronado-Cervantes, 154 F.3d 
1242. 1243-45 (I Oth Cir. 1998)). 
154United Stales v. Remoi, 404 F.3d 789, 795 (3d Cir. 2005). 
155fd. at 796. 
156374 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. 2004). 
157/d. at 344. 
158/d. 
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The Third Circuit attempted to distinguish the two definitions of force noting that 
in Sarmiento-Funes , lack of consent was defined broadly by the statute at issue in 
that case to include instances where there was consent-in-fact, whereas in Remoi, the 
victims were incapable of any consent.159 Though it rejected the position that non-
consensual sex acts are forcible , the Fifth Circuit had ' 'expressly reaf1irmed that 
sexual abuse of a minor is a crime of violence. "160 The Third Circuit reasserted its 
analogy to sexual crimes against minors stating that the " [Sarmiento-Funes] ruling, 
therefore, did not shut the door on treating sexual acts involving other types of 
helpless victims as ' forcible. ' " 161 The court concluded that its decision was 
consistent with the positions taken by other circuits.162 
The fact that the Third Circuit used most of the last page of the Remoi decision to 
show continuity with other circuits suggests that the court hoped its expansion of the 
concept of force would be broadly accepted. 163 While the Remoi decision hinted at 
broadly using lack of consent as a means of detlning " forcible," the court limited this 
proposition by narrowing it to instances where the victim was incapable of consent in 
its attempt to reconcile with the Fifth Circuit. 164 Despite these attempts to gain 
widespread acceptance, both the Ninth and Fifth Circuits subsequently rejected 
defining •·forcible" in any tem1s other than ·'physical compulsion." 
C. Two Steps Back: The Ninth and Fifth Circuits 
Both the Ninth and Fifth Circuits explicitly rejected the expansion of the concept 
of Ioree as described by the Third Circuit in Remoi. lhS The rulings of both the Ninth 
and Fifth Circuits mirror Dripps' proposed sentencing scheme. 166 In both cases, non-
consensual sex otTenses not committed through physical force are punished as lesser 
crimes. 
I. United States v. Beltran-Munguia 
The Ninth Circuit's rejection of Remoi came on June 7 , 2007 in United States v. 
Beltran-Munguia. 167 The court held that " force" should be defined solely in physical 
terms and that non-consensual sex is not "forcible."1<'8 The Ninth Circuit reached 
this conclusion through a ve1y different analysis than that previously applied by the 
Third Circuit in Remoi. 
15
''Remoi. 404 F.Jd at 796. 
H•0fc/. (citing United States v. Sarmi~nto-Funcs, 374 F.3d .B6, 344 (5th Cir. 2004)). 
161 Remoi, 404 F.3d at 796. 
162 /d. 
16J Jd. 
!6-l/J. 
1 "~See United States v. Gol\lez-Gome7.. 493 F.Jd 562, 56R (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. 
Bcltran-Munguia. 4X<) F.3d 104:2. 1047 (9th Cir. 2007). 
IM>See sources cited S11pm notes 42-43. 
!'>? Be/tran-Jfunguia, 489 f . .3d I 042 (9th C:ir. 2007 ). 
"'~Jd. at I 043. 
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Mr. Beltran-Munguia pled guilty to illegal reentry after previously committing a 
second degree sexual battery in violation of Oregon law.169 The Ninth C ircuit had to 
determine if this prior conviction consti tuted a " crime of violence'' under the 
Guidelines. The court started the analysis under the same two-'..vay approach of 
determining a "crime of violence'' under the Guidelines-the enumerated crimes or 
the physical force element approach no However, the court analyzed the two prongs 
in reverse order. 171 Without explanation, court started the analysis with the elemental 
approach. 172 
To determine if violation of the Oregon statute required force as an element. the 
cou11 considered the language of the statute, the statute's legislative history, the types 
of victims protected by the statute, and the nature of sexual penetration. 173 In the 
statutory language, the court focused on the phrase ·'the victim does not consent 
thereto.''174 The court identified this phrase as the central element for the offense.17 ~ 
Since the phrase identified "the victim's lack of consent [as] the crime's defining 
characteristic,'' the offense cou ld not be deemed to categorically require force as an 
elernent. 176 
169/d Mr. Beltran Munguia had violated Oregon Jaw. which defined the offense as: 
(I) A person commits the crime of sexual abuse in the second degree when that person 
subjects another person to sexual intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse or, except as 
provided in ORS 163.412 [where ·'( l) The penetration is part of a medically 
recognized treatment or diagnostic procedure: or (2) The penetration is accomplished 
by a peace officer or a corrections officer acting in ofticial capacity, or by medical 
personnel at the request of such an officer, in order to search for weapons, contraband 
or evidence of crime."], penetration of the vagina, anus or penis with any object other 
than the penis or mouth of the actor and the victim does not consent thereto. 
(2) Sexual abuse in the second degree is a Class C felony. 
OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 163.425 (West 2008). Oregon law defines incapacity to consent 
as: 
( l) A person is considered incapable of consenting to a sexual act if the person is: 
(a) Under 18 years of age; 
(b) Mentally defective; 
(c) Mentally incapacitated; or 
(d) Physically helpless. 
(2) A lack of verbal or physical resistance does not, by itself. constitute consent but 
may be considered by the trier of fact along with all other relevant evidence. 
!d. § 163.315( I )-(2). Mr. Remoi 's victim was considered to be physically helpless. 
"'Physically helpless ' means that a person is unconscious or for any other reason is 
physically unable to communicate unwillingness to an act." /d. § 163.305(5). 
110Beltran-Munguia. 489 F.3d at I 044. 
171 ln 2003, the Sentencing Commission amended the definition of 'crime of violence· to 
list the enumerated otknses first followed by the forcible element prong of the definition. 
U.S. SENTENCING G UIDELINES MANUAL§ 2L 1.2, app. n.l (B)(iii) (2003). 
m Beltran-Munguia, 489 F.3d at 1044. 
173/d. at I 045-48. 
174/d. at 1045. 
175Jd. 
176/d. 
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The court also concluded that the legislative history of the statute indicated that 
force was not a necessary element of the offense. 117 Oregon 's second degree sexual 
abuse statute was created to fill a gap in the state's criminal code. 178 Previously, the 
code fai led to criminalize "subject[ing] another to sexual intercourse without the 
victim ' s consent-but not by forcible compulsion."179 
Furthermore, the court stated that the types of victims protected by the statute 
seemed to reflect that the statute did not require force as an element. 180 Some of the 
victims protected by the statute were victims incapable of consent. 181 Victims 
deemed incapable of consent included those under the age of eighteen, the mentally 
defective, the mentally incapacitated, or the physically helpless. 182 The court viewed 
these types of protected victims as evidence that the statute did not require an 
element of force, because though these victims are incapable of legal consent, it is 
possible that they could consent-in-fact to the sexual act. 183 This reasoning echoed 
that used in Sarmiento-Funes by the Fifth Circuit. 184 
finally, the court stated that the force inherent in penetration was insufficient to 
establish an element of force in the offense. 1s5 Here, the court directly referenced the 
decision in Sarmiento-Funes ruling that "the act of penetration itself is not enough to 
supply the force required under§ 2L1.2."186 The court concluded that the Oregon 
statute did not make physical force an element of the crime of second-degree sexual 
abuse; therefore, the offense could not qualify as a "crime of violence" under the 
e lemental approach. 187 
After finding that second-degree sexual abuse could not qualify as a "crime of 
violence" under the elemental approach, the court devoted very little analysis to the 
first prong of the definition- the enumerated offenses. 18R The court stated, "Beltran-
Munguia's prior conviction does not qualify . . . [under the) 'forcible sex offenses' 
alternative either."1 ~') The court explained, ''Not surprisingly, given its language, we 
117/d. 
118Beltran-Munguia. 489 F.3d at I 045. 
17'1/d. (quoting State v. Stamper. 106 P.Jd 172, 177-78 (Or. Ct. App. 2005)). 
180/d. at 1045 n.J. 
181 /d. at 1045. 
182/d. at I 046. The statutory definition of ·'mentally incapacitated'' included those victims 
who were rendered incapable of consent "because of the influence of a controlled or other 
intoxicating substance administered to the person without the consent of the person or because 
of any other act committed upon the person without her consent.'' OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 
163.305{4) (West 2007). 
JRJ Beltran-Munguia, 489 F.Jd at I 045. 
1 ~4United States v. Sam1iento-Funes, 374 F.3d 336, 342 (5th Cir. 2004). 
185Beftran-Munguia. 489 F.Jd at 1047. 
1 ~c'ld. (quoting Sarmiento-Funes, 374 F.3d at 340). 
IS? fd. al 1051. 
1 ~8/d. 
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have interpreted the phrase 'forcible sex offenses' as requiring the use of force, an 
interpretation that precludes application to the Oregon crime here at issue."190 
The Ninth Circuit did not analyze the meaning of "forcible" in the phrase, but 
instead relied heavily on prior precedent to find that Mr. Beltran-Munguia's offence 
did not constitute a "forcible sex offense."191 The court primarily relied on United 
States v. Lopez-Montanez, which held that California's sexual battery statute could 
not be considered a "forcible sex offense."192 There the court stated that under the 
statute, "the touching may be 'ephemeral' or committed without the use offorce."193 
The court reasoned that such contact is not "forcible" because it is not violent. 194 
Based on the court' s interpretation of the language in the Oregon statute, any force 
inherent in the act of penetration was not "violent'' force. 195 
The court specifically addressed and rejected the Third Circuit's reasoning in 
Remoi.'96 The court agreed with the Third Circuit that "sexual abuse of a minor," 
one of the enumerated offenses in the definition of "crime of violence," did not 
necessarily include violent physical force. 197 Such offenses are considered forcible 
by definition. 1 9~ Yet the court relied on Lopez-Montanez, which concluded that an 
offense committed against a victim who is not a minor does not "constitute[] a crime 
of violence if the statute of conviction does not require the use of force." 199 Based on 
this precedent, the court declined to define force absent the "application of direct 
physical force" and specifically rejected the Third Circuit's position.200 
While the Ninth Circuit found that Mr. Beltran-Munguia's offense did not 
constitute a crime of violence, two of the three Circuit Judges felt that this result was 
unjust.101 Both Judge Rymer and Judge Tallman wrote concurring opinions stating 
that had they not been bound by precedent they would have decided differently. 
190ld. 
1<11 /d. 
191/d. (citing United States v. Lopez-Montancz, 421 F.3d 926, 929 (9th Cir. 2005) ("[T)he 
force necessary to constitute a crime of violence .. . must actually be violent in nature.'') 
(quoting Ye v. INS, 214 F.3d I 128, I 133 (9th Cir. 2000))). 
193Lopez-Montanez, 421 F.3d at 929. 
1 ~4Beltran-Munguia, 489 F.Jd at 1051. This definition is circular. In applying the 
Sentencing Guideline, the court must determine if the defendant has committed a •·crime of 
violence." The Guidelines define "crime of violence" as a " forcible sexual offense." Here the 
court is defining "force" as "violence." As a result, "crime of violence" is defined as 
·'violence." This circular definition defeats any purpose of defining "crime of violence." The 
two part definition of "crime of violence." the enumerated list approach and the elemental 
approach, indicates that a variety of acts can be considered "violent." 
195/d. 
" '
6 /c/. at !051 n.8. 
197/d. 
I'JRRemoi, 404 F.3d at 796. 
199/d. (quoting Lopez-Montanez, 421 F.3d at 930). 
~011Beltran-Munguia. 489 F.3d at I 051 n.8 (quoting Remoi. 404 F.3d at 794). 
20 1/d. at 1053 (Rymer, J .• & Tallman . J., concurring). 
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2. Unjust Result of Precedent 
Judge Rymer stated, " ff we were writing on a clean slate, I would hold that non-
consensual penetration falls within the plain meaning of 'physical force."'202 Judge 
Tallman's concun·ing opinion was much more extensive. Judge Tallman stated, "[iJn 
our zeal to be good legal technicians, we are abandoning the role of common sense 
in fashioning appropriate punishment for repeat offenders like Beltran-Munguia."203 
He explained that he saw difficulties in separating forcible offenses from non-
consensual offenses. He stated that "[f]rom the victim's perspective, both acts are 
'violent. "'204 Despite this perspective, the judge stated that he could not say that the 
Oregon statute required an element of physical force. 205 Judge Tallman explained 
that if not for precedent. he would find that "the Oregon conviction categorically 
qualifies as a 'crime of violence' because it is a specifically enumerated offense-
namely, a 'forcible sex offense. "'200 
Furthermore, Judge Tallman expressed a willingness to depart from linking the 
definition of a violent sex offense to physical force.207 He acknowledged that an act 
committed forcibly and an act committed non-consensually share a common 
denominator-both are committed against the victim's will.208 Judge Tallman noted 
that ''forcible" can be defined in terms of being against the victim's will regardless of 
absence of physical torce.209 He argued that the 2003 amendment to the Guidelim:s 
actually supports this definition of force since the commentary specifically states that 
the element of physical force is not necessary for the enumerated of1enses.210 
Judge Tallman stated that "a fundamental rule of statutory construction supports 
interpreting 'forcible sex offenses' to encompass all sex acts taken against a victim's 
will."21 1 Judge Tallman continues by stating, "Specifically, courts should not 
interpret one provision in a way that renders another part of the same statute 
supernuous."212 He acknowledged the narrowing affect of analyzing the second 
prong of the definition of "violent crime" first, and stated that doing so "subsumes 
' forcible sex offenses,' and renders the phrase meaningless."213 Based on principles 
of statutory construction, Judge Tallman concluded that the court should have 
202Id. (Rymer, J., concurring). 
203 !d. (Tallman, J ., concurring). 
204ld. 
205Beltran-Munguia, 489 F.3d at 1053 (Tallman, J. , concurring). 
106/d. 
207Jd. 
208/d. 
209 /d. at I 054. 
210Beltran-Munguiu, 489 F.3d at I 054 (Tallman, J., concurring). 
211 !d. 
211/d. (citing United States v. Fish, 368 F.3d 1200. 1205 (9th Cir. 2004)). 
213/d. 
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followed the Third Circuit' s decision in United States v. Remoi.214 However, because 
of Ninth Circuit precedent, Judge Tallman reluctantly concurred in tinding that Mr. 
Beltran-Munguia had not committed a crime ofviolence.215 
3. United States v. Gomez-Gomez 
The most startling result of emphasizing physical force. in evaluating sexual 
ofttmses came in the case United States v. Gomez-Gomez.216 In Gomez-Gomez, the 
Fifth Circuit reviewed the application of the Sentencing Guidelines to a defendant 
who had illegally reentered the country after being convicted of forcible rape.211 
/d. 
~1 4/c/. 
215/d at I 055. Despite agreeing with the holding, Judge Tallman states in his concurrence: 
N~vertheless. there is confusion in our case law, and I urge our court to revisit any 
precedent that precludes us from classifying nonconsensual sex as a ''crime of 
violence" under section 2L1.2(b)( I )(A)(ii). We should join the Third Circuit and 
de line "forcible sex oflenses" to include any sexual act committed against the victim's 
will or consent. 
216494 F.3d 562 (5th Cir. 2007). 
2
" /d. at 564. The defendant wa:; previously convicted under California law, which 
defined rape as: 
(a) ... an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a person not the spouse of the 
perpetrator. under any of the following circumstances: 
(2) Where it is accomplished against a person's will by means of force, violence, 
duress, menace. or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the person or 
another. 
(7)(h) As used in this section. "duress" means a direct or implied threat of force, 
violence, danger, hardship, or retribution sufficient to coerce a reasonable person of 
ordinary susceptibilities to perfonn an act which otherwise would not have been 
perfonncd, or acquiesce in an act to which one otherwise would not have submitted. 
The total circumstances, including the age of the victim. and his or her relationship to 
the defendant. are factors to consider in appraising the existence of duress. 
(c) As used in this section, "menace" means any threat, declaration, or act which 
shows an intention to intlict an injury upon another. 
CAL. PtONAl CODE § :!61 ( 1990). 
Though nut directly at issue in Gomez-Gome:, the language also defined rape as, 
intercourse without consent due to disability, intercourse where the victim's resistance has 
been overcome hy use of a drug. intercourse where the victim is unconscious, intercourse by 
deception. intercourse by threat of retaliation, and intercourse by threatened use of public 
authority. /d. § 261 ( l )-(7). This broad range of acts included in the definition of rape 
illustrates an emphasis placed on defining rape in terms of lack of consent rather than simply 
the use of physical force to achieve intercourse. 
It i1. important to note that while this offense is called "forcible rape," this title is not 
relevant to the com1's analysis of the application of the Sentencing Guidelines. The Supreme 
Colllt has stated that a particular otTense "must have some uniform definition independent of 
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Since the court applied a categorical analysis under Taylor, the facts of Mr. Gomez-
Gomez's offense '''ere not analyzed or disclosed.m 
Despite the construction of the definition of "crime of violence'' in the 
Sentencing Guidelines (enumerated offenses followed by the forcible element 
analysis), the Fifth Circuit started the analysis in reverse order just as the Ninth 
Circuit had done in Beltran-A1unguia.m Under the elemental approach, the court 
quickly determined that the defendant's crime of forcible rape did not include an 
element of physical force.2~0 
The court found that "forcible rape" under the California statute could be 
committed without using physical forcc~21 based on the I 991 version of California's 
"forcible rape" statute, the version of the statute that Mr. Gomez-Gomez had 
violated.m A subsection of the statute defined "force" in terms of "duress."223 
Duress was defined by the statute as "a direct or implied threat of force , violence, 
danger, hardship, ur retribwion sufficient to coerce a reasonable person of ordinary 
susceptibilities to perforn1 an act which otherwise would not have been performed, or 
acquiesce in an act to which one otherwise would not have submitted."224 
The court locused on the terms ·'hardship'' and "retribution" and decided that 
''duress" encompassed more than physical coercion .225 Based on the use of these 
terms in the statute, the court reasoned that rape could be committed by several non-
forcible means. Rape could be committed through "hardship," such as by threats to 
reveal embarrassing information about the victim.216 Likewise, rape could be 
committed through "retribution" by an employer's threat to fire the victim unless 
sexual act<; were performed.127 Since rape as defined by the statute could be 
committed without physical force , the court reasoned that force could not be 
the labels employed by the various States' criminal codes." Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 
575, 592 ( 1990). 
21 8United States v. Gomez-Gomez. 493 FJd 563, 566 n.3 (5th Cir. 2007). 
21q!d. at 564. The court followed the precedent of Sarmiento-Funes, where the court stated 
that the elemental analysis helped define the enumerated offenses. 374 F.3d 336, 345 (5th Cir. 
2004). 
220Gomez-Gomez. 493 FJd at 564. 
221 /d. at 564-65. 
222/d. at 564. 
mfd. at 565. 
224/d. (quoting CAL. PENAL COD I~ § 261 (b) ( 1990)). 
m id. at 564. The court noted that there was very little case law applying "hardship" and 
"retribution" as means of achieving ·•forcible rape." /d. at 565 n.2. The lack of case law stems 
partly from the fact that "hardship'' was only included in the statutory definition of "duress" 
from 1990 through 1993. !d. During this time period there was only one case that dealt with 
the threat of hardship sufficient to constitute "duress" under the "forcible rape" statute. !d. In 
People v. Bergschneider. 211 Cal. App. 3d 144 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989), a stepfather was 
convicted of forcible rape were he told his stepdaughter that he would ground her if she did 
not have sex with him. Jd. at 150-51. 
226Gomez-Gomez. 493 F.3d at 564. 
27Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2009
336 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:309 
considered an clement of the crime.m There fore, when Mr. Gomez-Gomez was 
convicted of· 'forcible rape" the actual, attempted, or threatened use of force was not 
an e lement of the crime, and his offense could not be considered a "violent crime" 
unde r the elemental analysis.129 
After finding that California 's " forcible rape" statute could not be defined as a 
"crime of violence" under the elemental analysis, the court proceeded with the 
enumerated offense analysis.230 In analyz ing whether the California conviction 
constituted a "forcible sex offence," the court started by referring to the Supreme 
Court's decision in Taylor stating that lower courts must "consider the enumerated 
crimes in the 'generic sense in which [they are] now used in the criminal codes of 
most States. "'23 1 The court stated the "generic, contemporary meaning" of "forcible 
sex offence .. could be determined using preexisting Fifth Circuit precedent which 
s uggested that "forcible rape' ' under the California statute did not qualify as a 
" forc ible sex offense.''232 
The court stated that to qualify as a "forcible sex offense" all means of violating 
the statute must qualify as "forcible sex offenses."m S ince the court had already 
found means of violating the statute without physical force (hardship and 
retribution), the court concluded that not all means of violating the statute qualified 
as ·'forcibl e sex offenses.''134 In coming to this conclusion, the court plainly stated 
that "(the elemental and enumerated offence approaches] are essentially the same 
question. "lJS The court added that prior case law suggested that "any statute that 
does not satisfy the elements prong will also not qualify as a 'forcible sex 
offense. ···=J<· 
Despite the court 's assertion that the two tests prescribed by the Guideline were 
essentially the same, the court proceeded to analyze Mr. Gomez-Gomez's offense in 
light of the Guideline's enumerated "forcible sex offence."237 In proceeding with the 
"forcible sex offense" analysis, the court defined force as " physical force that 
overcomes reasonable resistance; or [a] threat express or implied, that places a 
person in reasonable fear of death, serious physical injury, or kidnapping of such 
person or another person."=;~ In using this definition. the court interpreted the 
~1"Swmiento-Frmes, 374 F.3d at 341 ("Since some (though not all) methods of violating 
the Missouri statute do not n:quire the use of physical force against the victim, the statute 
thcrd'ore does nm have. as an element. the usc of physical force against the person of another) 
(ril ing United States v. Vargas-Duran. 35() F.Jd 598, 605 (5th Cir. 2004) (en bane)). 
-!19/cl. 
!WG'onw::-Gome:;. 493 F.3d at 566. 
211 /d. (yuoting Taylor v. United Stales, 495 U.S. 575, 598 ( 1990)). 
~~=/d. 
= 14 /d. 
2.1.'/d. 
~'-' <'G'tJme::-Gume;:. 493 F.3d at 566 n.4. 
2.17/d. at 567-68. 
=-'~!d. at 567 n.5 (quoting Sarmiento-Funes, 374 F.3d at339 n.2). 
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Guideline' s enumerated "forcible sex offense" as containing a premise that any force 
used in the offense would be by its nature physical force_13'1 
The court's decision was not based on a definitional analysis of "forcible sex 
offense" as much as it was based on precedent 240 In previous cases, the court 
decided that all of the following were not "forcible" for purposes of the Guidelines: 
sex by intoxication or deception even if the otfender knows the sex is not 
consensual,241 sex with a minor and sex accomplished by deceiving the victim into 
believing that the offender was her spouse,~~2 sex with a person who is incapable of 
consent due to mental defect or incapacitation because of alcohol or drugs,243 and sex 
that "exploits the [victim's] emotional dependency.''244 In the COLIIt 's reasoning, the 
common thread through all of these scenarios was that though the acts may be in 
violation of the victim's wi II, the acts are not committed through use or threat of 
"physical force."245 Similarly, since the California "forcible rape" statute at issue in 
Gomez-Gomez could be violated without physical force or threat of physical force, 
therefore, the court found that violation of the statute was not a "torcible sex 
offense" under the Guidelines as interpreted by the Fifth Circuit.246 
In reaching the conclusion that the California "torcible rape statute" did not meet 
the definition of "forcible sex offense," the Fifth Circuit specifically declined to 
follow the Third Circuit's decision in United States v. Remoi. The Remoi decision 
had specifically rejected the Fifth Circuit 's previous reasoning in Sarmiento-
Funes.241 The court noted that the Third and Fifth Circuits' positions were clearly 
different and any resolution could only be ach ieved through an en bane decision?~~ 
239/d. at 567. 
240/d. 
241 United States v. Sarmiento-Funes. 374 F.Jd 336 (5th Cir. 2004). 
242United States v. Palomares-Candcla, 104 F. App'x 957,961 (5th Cir. 2004). 
243United States v. Meraz-Enriquez, 442 F.3d 331, 333 (5th Cir. 2006). 
244United States v. Luciano-Rodriques, 442 FJd 320, 322 (5th Cir. 2006). 
245Unitcd States v. Gomez-Gomez. 493 F.3d 562, 567 (5th Cir. 2007). 
246ld. It should be noted that in concluding that the Califomia "forcible rape'' statute did 
not meet the definition of "torcible sex offense" under the Guidelines. the court added a 
footnote addressing the concept of ··constrUI.:tive force." !d. at 567 n.6. In United States v. 
Beliew, the Fifth Circuit determined that molestation by duress and psychological intimidation 
would constitute "forcible compulsion" through the legal fiction or "constructive force." 492 
F.3d 314, 316 (5th Cir. 2007). However. the court went on to explain that ' ·the fiction of 
'constructive force' is bounded by Sarmiento-Funes." !d. The court concluded that any 
contlict between the holdings of Beliew and Gome:z-Gomez may provide a valuable 
opportunity for the court to reconsider precedent but any reconsideration would have to he 
done by the Fifth Circuit sitting en bane. Gomez-Gome::. 493 F.3d at 567 n.6. 
241See United States v. Fernandcz-Cuso. 447 F.Jd 382. 387-88 (5th Cir. 2006). 
248Gomez-Gomez, 493 F.3d at 568. 
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4. Need for a Common Sense Approach 
Judge E. Grady Jolly concurred in the majority opinion but expressed a desire for 
the case to be reconsidered en banc.249 He asserted that "under any common sense 
standard" sex against the will of the victim is "forcible sex" and is, therefore, a 
"crime of violence."250 The judge analyzed the California forcible rape statute using 
the following syllogism: 
When a woman is coerced to have sex against her will because of threats 
that could impair or devastate her life, it is unwilling sex; if it is unwilling 
sex, it is not unforced sex; and if it is not unforced sex, it is forcible sex 
within the meaning of the Sentencing Guidelines.251 
Despite this common sense approach. the court was bound by the precedent set 
by Sarmiento-Funes.252 Judge Jolly stated, "[u]nder Sarmiento-Funes, the majority is 
forced to conclude that forcible sex is not forcible sex."253 This paradoxical 
conclusion was the result of Sarmiento-Funes' mixing the elemental approach with 
the enumerated analysis and "frustrat[ing] the intent of the Sentencing 
Guidelines."254 Mixing the two methods of analysis eliminated the need for two 
distinct approaches and violated common rules of statutory interpretation because it 
eliminated the need for a portion of the statutory language.255 
Judge Jolly argued that the Fifth Circuit should have followed the Third Circuit's 
decision in United States v. Remoi.256 He explained that the Third Circuit's 
conclusion that "one can commit a 'forcible sexual offence' ... without employing 
physical force was consistent with the Sentencing Guidelines' amended definition of 
''crime of violence."257 Judge Jolly concluded with stating that he hoped the issue is 
reheard en bane to address the confusion generated by the Fifth Circuit's precedent. 
D. A Move in the Right Direction: United States v. Romero-Hernandez 
On October 16, 2007, the Tenth Circuit Court recognized a non-consensual sex 
offense as a "crime of viol.ence."258 The case involved a sexual offense committed 
24~/d. at 569 (Jolly, J .• concurring). 
250/d. 
251 /d. Judge Jolly uses the language "against her will because of threats that could impair 
or devastate her life" as a parallel to the language of the California "forcible rape" statue 
which uses the language defming rape as sex committed against the victim's will by means 
including duress or menace. !d. (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (a)(2) (1991 )). The 
significance of the syllogism is the emphasis of defining the sexual offense in terms of the 
victim's will. 
252Gomez-Gomez, 493 F.3d at 569 (Jolly, 1., concurring). 
253ld. 
254Id. 
255 !d. at 570 (citing White v. Black, 190 F.3d 366, 368-69 (5th Cir. 1999)). 
2S6Jd. 
251Id. 
258United States v. Romero-Hemandez, 505 F.3d 1082 (lOth Cir. 2007). 
30https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol57/iss2/9
2009] THE LABORATORY OF JUDICIAL DEBATE 339 
against a physically helpless victim and provided the circuit an opportunity to 
address the issue left open by Sarmiento-Funes-whcther where there is no factual 
assent, "use of force" could be present for purposes of the Guidelines. m According 
to Dripps' system, sex with a physically helpless victim should "uncontroversial[lyl" 
be considered Sexual Expropriation and result in a modest penalty.~60 The Tenth 
Circuit came to the opposite conclusion holding that non-consensual sex imposed on 
a helpless victim constitutes a "crime of violence. "261 
Felipe Romero-Hemandez, a Mexican national, pled guilty to illegal reentry in 
violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2).~~1 Prior to his illegal reentry. Mr. 
Romero-Hemandez had pled guilty in state court to misdemeanor unlawful sexual 
contact263 He was sentenced to 720 days of imprisonment and was subsequently 
deported. Less than six months following his guilty plea in state court, Mr. Romero-
Hemandez was arrested in New Mexico and charged with a federal offense.264 The 
district court followed the Pre-Sentencing Report (PSR),265 which recommended an 
2S9United States v. Sanniento-Funes, 374 F.3d 336, 341 n.X (5th Cir. 2004). 
260Dripps, supra note IS, at 1800. 
261 Romero-Hernande=, 505 F.3d at I 089. 
262/d. at 1084. 8 U.S.C. § l326(a) states that any alien who has been deported and renters 
"shall be fined under Title 18. or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both.'' 8 U.S.C § 
1326(a) ( 1992). 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) imposes criminal penalties for reentry on aliens 
"whose removal was subsequent to a conviction for commission of an aggravated felony, such 
alien shall be fined under such Title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both." /d. !i 
1326(b)(2). 
263Romero-Hernandez, 505 l-.3d at 1084. Mr. Komero Hernandez vtolated Colorado law, 
which defined sexual acts as involving acts committed without the victim's consent or when 
the victim has some diminished capacity to consent (due to physical condition or legal status). 
COLO. REv. S fAT. ANN. § 18-3-404( I )(a)-(g) (2008). The statute specifically provides: 
/d. 
Any actor who knowingly subjects a victim to any sexual contact commit!> unlawful 
sexual contact if: 
(a) The actor knows that the victim does not consent: or (b) The actor knows that the 
victim is incapable of appraising the nature of the victim's conduct; or (c) The victim 
is physically helpless and the actOr knows that the victim is physically helpless and the 
victim has not consented; or (d) The act.or has substantially impaired the victim's 
power to appraise or control the victim's conduct by employing, without thl! victim's 
consent, any drug. intoxicant, or other means tor the purpose of causing submission; 
or (e) repealed. (t) The victim is in custody of law or detained in a hospital or other 
institution and the actor has supcJVisory or disciplinary authority over the victim and 
usl!s this position of authority. unless incident to a lawful search. to coerce the victim 
to submit; or (g) The actor engages in treatment or examination of a victim for other 
than bona fide medical purposes or in a manner substantially inconsistent witll 
reasonable medical practices. 
2~Romero-Hemandez, 505 F.3d at 1084. 
m Mr. Romero-Hernandez argued that the PSR was improper because "hi!> state conviction 
was neither a felony nor a crime of violence.'' Romeru-1/ernandez. 505 F.3d at I 085. The 
District Court rejected the argument holding that the state offense constituted a felony and a 
·' forcible sex offense" which is "specifically enumerated as a ·crime of violence' under the 
Guidelines." /d. (ci ting U.S. SE!"TENCING GUIDELI~r,s § 2L 1.2 cmt. n. I(B)(ii•)). The court 
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adjusted offense level of 21 based on an upward adjustment for a prior felony 
conviction for a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines.266 
Whether "a sex offense is 'forcible ' if it is nonconsensual, including those 
situations in which the victim is legally or medically unable to consent," was an issue 
of first impression for the court.267 In analyzing this issue, the court considered 
whether a "forcible" sex offense had to be accomplished by means of physical 
force,268 as well as whether nonconsensual sexual contact is inherently forcible.26') 
Based on its analysis of these factors, as discussed below, the court affirmed the 
district court's decision, holding that Mr. Remere-Hernandez's offense was a ''crime 
or violence" because it met the definition of force. 270 
The circuit court analyzed the issue using the categorical approach adopted in 
Taylor v. United States.271 The categorical analysis required the court to look only to 
the statutory description of a crime and to disregard the particular facts of the case.272 
Under this approach, the circuit court "conclude[ d) that the particular section of the 
Colorado state at issue prohibits conduct that is categorically a crime of violence 
under § 2LI.2 .... "273 
The pivotal point of analysis that led the Tenth Circuit to reach this conclusion 
was the court's approach to defining "force" and "forcible." The Guidelines do not 
provide a definition of "forcible sex offense.'m4 Therefore, the court had to look at 
the "ordinary, contemporary, and common" meaning of the phrase.275 
sentenced Mr. Romero-Hernandez to forty-six months of imprisonment and two years of 
supervised release. /d. On appeal, Mr. Romero-Hemandez argued that while his state 
conviction for unlawful sexual contact " is a felony offense for purposes the Guidelines[,]" it is 
not a "crime of violence.'' /d. 
260 ld. at I 084. It should be noted that the Guidelines also allow for downward 
adjustments. A downward adjustment is applied when, 
the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense. 
decrease the offense level by 2 levels ... [and when the] ... defendant has assisted 
authorities in the investigation or prosecution of his own misconduct by timely 
notifying authorities of his intention to enter a plea of guilty, thereby permitting the 
government to avoid preparing for trial and pem1itting the government and the court to 
allocate their resources efficiently, decrease the offense level by I additional level. 
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3EI.J(a-b) (2007). Due to his guilty plea, Mr. 
Romero-Hernandcz received a downward adjustment of three levels. Romero-Hernandez, 505 
F.3d at I 084. 
267/d. at 1087. 
268/d. at l 089. 
~69/d. 
270Jd. at I 089. 
27 1/d. at I 085 (citing Tavlor, 495 U.S. at 600). 
272Romero-Hernandez, 505 F.3d at 1085-86. 
m id at 1086. 
m id at 1087. 
2751d (citing Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37,42 ( 1979)). 
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While the court analyzed the phrase "sex offense,'' the definition central to the 
case was that of "forcible."276 The court looked to Black's Law DictionG/y to 
determine the common usage of the word "forciblc."277 "Black 's generally defines 
'forcible' as '[e]ITected by force or threat of force against opposition or 
resistance. "27s The court refused to infer a requirement of "physical compulsion 
sufficient to overcome 'opposition or resistance'" from this definition for two 
reasons.279 First, the court referred to the context of personal trespass where Black's 
defines the unlawful touching of another as being "forcible" regardless of degree.280 
Second, the court noted that the word "force" can be independent of physical 
compulsion.2~ 1 The court used a series of definitions, including the definitions of 
"force" and "power," to demonstrate that "force" can be defined in common usage 
without reference to a physical component.m In addition, the court stated that 
omitting the requirement of the physical element was consistent with prior case 
law.283 Jn United States v. Holly, the court had stated that ''force may be interred by 
such facts as disparity in size between victim and assailant, or disparity in coercive 
power."284 Thus, the court in Romero-Hernandez conc luded that "where one party 
has sufficient control of a situation to overcome another's free will, force is 
present."285 Therefore, Mr. Romero-Hemandez's conviction under Colorado state 
law could be characterized as "forcible" since the sexual act committed was without 
the victim's consent.2K6 
The court's conclusion, which separated the concept of force from the notion of 
physical compulsion, was consistent with the Guidelines. The court noted that the 
Sentencing Guideline application note for§ 2LI.2 cmt. n.I(B)(iii), which enumerates 
276/d. ''A ·sex offense' is commonly understood as '[a]n offense involving unlawful 
sexual conduct., .. !d. (quoting BLACK ·sLAW DICTIONARY II 12 (8th ed. 2004)). 
277 /d. (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 674 (8th ed. 2004)). 
m Romero-Hernandez, 505 f.3d at 1087 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 674 (8th ed. 
2004)). 
279The Fifth Circuit used this same definition of "forcible" in United States v. Sarmiento-
Funes, 374 F.3d 336. 344 (5th Cir. 2004). Based on this definition, the Fifth Circuit slated, "it 
seems that the adjective ·forcible' centrally denotes a species of force that ... approximates 
the concept of forcible compulsion." !d. 
280Romero-Hernandez, 505 F.3d at 1087. "To lay one's finger on another person without 
lawful justification is as much a forc ible injury in the eye of the law . .. as to beat him with a 
stick.'' /d (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 674 (8th ed. 2004)). 
281/d. at I 088. 
282/d. The com1 focused on ·•force" being defined in terms of"power." !d. "Power" was 
defined as ''[d]ominance. control, or influence.'' !d. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1207 
(8th ed. 2004)). Dominance, control, and influence can all be exerted non-physically. 
~SJ/d. 
2&4488 F.3d 1298, 1302 (I Oth Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Reyes Pen a, 216 F.3d 
1204, 1211 ( lOth Cir. 2000)). 
m Romero-Hernande;;. 505 F.3d at I 088. 
~~f>See COLO. REV. STAT. A NN. § 18-3-404( I) (2007). 
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"forcible sex oflense" as a "crime of violence," does not usc the modifier "physical" 
before "forcc."2x7 Al1er the list of enumerated offenses, the general definition of 
' 'crime of violence'' includes any offence that "has as an element the use, attempted 
use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.''m The court 
concluded that the omission of the word ''physical" in the phrase "forcible sex 
offense'' indicates that the Commission intended the concept of force pertaining to 
sexual offenses to include more that merely physical force. 2~9 The court noted that 
its conclusion was supported by the fact that other crimes enumerated in the list (e.g .. 
statutory rape and sexual abuse of a minor) do not require physical compulsion.291' 
In concluding, the Tenth Circuit emphasized defining force in terms of 
overcoming lack of consent rather than in terms of overcoming phys ical resistance.291 
The court stated that " [wjhen an offense involves sexual contact w ith another person, 
it is necessarily forcible when that person does not consent."N2 While the victim is 
not physically resisting, the victim 's lack of consent constitutes a fom1 of resistance. 
The perpetrator overcomes this resistance in his own mind where the ' 'knowledge of 
this lack of consent is insufficient to protect the victim."M 
While the court upheld Mr. Romero-Hemandez' s sentence as a ' 'forcible sex 
offense" under the Guidelines, the logical explanation employed to reach that 
conclusion should be unnecessary. Much of the court's reasoning focused on 
definitions to show that ''force" did not necessarily require a physical element. The 
court should not have to parse the Guidelines' language to detem1ine that non-
consensual sex offenses arc "forcible'' and therefore "crimes of violence." 
VI. WilY THE NINTII AND FIFTH CIRCUITS GOT IT WRONG 
Both the Fifth and Ninth Circuits' application of the Sentencing Guidelines and 
Dripps' proposed system fall short for assigning such a small penalty value to 
violations of the will. In both instances violations of the will were punished; 
however, the punishment was insufficient. 
The Ninth and Fifth Circuits applied the 2007 Sentencing Guidelines differently 
than the Third and Tenth Circuits for several reasons. Differences between the views 
expressed within the circuit split were based on perspective. The Ninth and Fifth 
Circuits' perspective, like Dripps' system, viewed the offense in terms of the 
defendant ' s actions. The Third and Tenth Circuits' perspective was based on the 
victim and the results of the defendant's actions. This difference in perspective is 
evidenced in how the circuits interpreted the Guideline and dctined the issues in 
question. Ultimately, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits ' rulings were the result of their 
interpretation of the language of the Guideline and the definitions of "force" and 
" forcible'' that guided their conclusions. 
:~1 Romero-Hernandez, 505 F.Jd at I 088. 
2~KU .S. SENTENU NG G UIOEI. II'F.S MANUAL§ 2L 1.2 t:ml. n. l (R)(iii) (2007 ). 
2~'' Rom.:ro-Hernande::, 505 F.Jc.l at I 088. 
2'1il/d. 
291 /d. 
:
92/d at I 089 (citing Unircd Slates v. Remoi, 404 F.3d 789,796 (3d Cir. 2005)). 
29.) !d. 
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A. Wrong as a Matter o( lmerprewtion 
Both the Ninth and Fifth Circuits analyzed .. crime of violence" under § 2L 1.2 
starting with the second prong of the detinition (the elemental approach). Starting 
with the second prong of th~ definition of .. crime or violence" under § 2L 1.2 was 
incorrect in light of the 2003 amendment to the definition of "crime of violence'' 
provided by the Sentencing Guidelines.2Q" In 2003. the Sentencing Commission 
reversed the order of the definition. placing the enumerated offenses before the 
elemental approach.~,,~ The Commission stated that one of the purposes of the 
amendment was clarity. 2~c· According to the Commission, "(tJhe amended definition 
makes clear that the enumerated offenses are always classified as 'crimes of 
violence,' regardless of whether the prior oftense expressly has as an element the 
use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of 
another. "2'17 The Commission specitically did not want the ·'physical force" element 
confused as a requirement for the enumerated offenscs.1~~ 
In light of the amendment, the elemental approach to defining "crime of 
violence'' logically serves to expand upon the enumerated list of offenses specified 
as "crimes of violence." Under this expansive approach, the first prong containing 
enumerated offenses is always defined as ''crimes of violence;' and the second prong 
of the definition allows other offenses which include the element of physical force, 
but that are not enumerated, to also meet the definition. 
The Ninth and Fifth Circuits· reversal of the order of analysis-the elemental 
approach before the enumerated crimes approach-had the opposite effect. The 
courts' reverse approach restricted the definition of "crime of violence'' rather than 
expand it. Both courts essentially used the second prong of the definition to infonn 
the first. As a result, the element of physical force seemed to be a requirement of the 
enumerated offenses. JQ<I This conclusion is supported by the fact that the Ninth 
Circuit in Be/tran-Munguia never examined the definition of "force" under the first 
prong of the definition where "forcible sex otlenses" are enumerated as a "crime of 
violence.''300 Instead, the court simply reasoned that if the state statute did not 
include an element of physical force, the offense could also not be a "forcible sex 
offense.''''" 
2~~U.S. S ENTENCIN<.i G UIDELINES MANUA L S 2LI.2. app. n.I(B)(iii) (2003), quoted in 
United States v. Remoi, 404 F.3d 789, 795 n.4 (3d Cir. 2005 ). 
zq~ld. at 795-96. 
l'i<'U.S. SENTENCING G UIDELINES MANUAL. app. C (Vol. Ill. amend. 658, at 392-93 (2003). 
m id. at 393. 
2~8/d. 
199The importation of the physical force requirement is the very type of confusion which 
the Sentencing Commission sought to avoid with the 2003 amendment. See sources cited 
supra notes 147-49. 
300United States v. Beltran-Munguia, 489 FJd I 042. I 051 (9th Cir. 2007). The court 
stated, "ln]ot surprisingly, given its language, we have interpreted the phrase 'forcible sex 
offenses' as requiring the use of force, an interpretation that precludes application to the 
Oregon crime here at issue.'' /d. 
Jl)l /d. 
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Similarly, in Gomez-Gomez, the Fifth Circuit's view of the two tests-that the 
elemental test essentially makes the enumerated offense test unnecessary- ignored 
the text of the Guideline. The court's statement that the two parts of the definition 
are essentially the same makes the enumerated list of offenses in the Guideline 
meaningless.302 Furthermore, this view ignored the expressed intent of the 
Sentencing Commission in the drafting of the amendment to the Guideline's note.303 
Both courts' conclusions ignored the absence of the modifier "physical" in 
"forcible sex offenses."304 This distinction was discussed in United States v. 
Remoi.305 While both the Ninth and Fifth Circuits specifically rejected the Third 
Circuit's decision in Remoi, each failed to address this distinction.306 By failing to 
recognize the absence of the modifier " physical," both courts did not consider the 
possibility of"force" being defined in any terms other than physical compulsion. 
B. Wrong by Definition 
Both the Ninth and Fifth Circuit decisions were based, not just on their 
interpretations of the language in the Guideline, but also on the courts' definitions of 
"force" and "forcible." Both courts defined "force" and "forcible" solely in terms of 
violent physical compulsion. As a result, the courts did not consider any alternative 
definitions. 
While the Fifth Circuit found that the second degree sexual battery under Oregon 
law in Beltran-Munguia did not contain an element of physical force, it overlooked 
the language of the statute that indicated the presence of force in the oftense.307 Even 
disregarding the non-consensual nature of the second degree sexual battery, the 
statute's use of the term "subjects" implies a level of force against the victim.-'08 In 
serving as a verb, " to subject" means " to cause or force to undergo or endure 
(something unpleasant, inconvenient, or trying).''309 However, since the court was 
specifically looking lor a pl~vsical element of force under the elemental approach of 
302See White v. Black. 190 F.3d 366. 36ll·69 (5th C'ir. 199'.1). 
303U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELfNl.'S MANI.it\L. app. C (V0l. II), amend. 658, at 392-93 {2003). 
304See U.S. SENTENCING GUJOELINI:S !VIANi "AL § ']f.l.2tb){ I )(A){ii) (2007). 
305United States v. Remoi, 404 F . .3d 7l:N, 794 (3d Cir. 2005). 
300United States v. Beltran-Munguia. 489 F.3d 1042. 10:'1 n.8 (9th Cir. 2007). 
307 See supra note 169. 
308M 8 I M . . d . r. e tran- ungma was convJcte OJ sen.nd degree sexual abuse. Beltran-Munguia. 
489 F.3d at 1043. Under the state statute, "[a] person commits the crime of sexual abuse in 
the second degree when that person suhjects another person to sexual intercourse, deviate 
sexual intercourse ... and the victim does not consent thereto." OR. REv. STAT. ANN. * 
163.425( I) (2008) (emphasis added). 
309M · w b o 1· o· · · ernam- e ster n ltle ICtJOnary (2007), available at http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary. The etymology of the word indicates that it comes from .mb- + j 11cere 
to throw, literally meaning "to throw undt:r."' ld When viewed in this context. to suQject 
another person against their will does carry a forcibly. violc::nt connotation. 
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the definition of "violent crime," the court never considered any altemative 
characteristics of force:' 10 
An overlooked aspect of the Fifth Circuit's definition of "forcible" in Gomez-
Gomez was the use of the word "reasonable." The court referred to the definition of 
"force" used in Sarmiento-Funes that included the phrase "[p}hysical force that 
overcomes reasonable resistance. ' '311 The introduction of an element of reasonable 
resistance should have been helpful in defining what level of force was necessary to 
be deemed "forcible compulsion." What resistance is deemed as reasonable should 
be judged from the circumstance of the situation and the condition of the victim. 
By definition, sexual offenses are always going to include a certain physical 
element. This physical element may range from penetration or touching to bodily 
force used to brutally overcome the victim. The amount of physical force used in the 
sexual offence may depend upon the level of resistance faced. As the definition used 
in Sarmiento-Funes seems to acknowledge, less physical force is needed to 
overcome a weaker or incapacitated victim (reasonable resistance).312 While the 
degree of physical force may be diminished based on the diminished capacity of the 
victim to resist, the fact that the sexual offence is against the victim 's will and is 
"forcible" remains. 
C. Wrong Because ojPerspective 
The Ninth and Fifth Circuits' decisions mirrored Dripps' system of punishment 
in that both assigned a low punishment value for non-consensual sex offenses. This 
application of the Guideline illustrated the dilemma of punishing violations of the 
will. There is a tendency to address the physical harms of sexual offenses.313 
Physical harms are easy to recognize and understand. However, what truly makes 
sexual crimes despicable is not the physical harm. Though the physical harm 
associated with sexual crimes cannot be minimized, that harm is not what 
distinguishes these offenses from common assault. What truly makes these crimes 
heinous- the true heart of sexual offenses-is the invasive violation of the will. 
Sexual violations of the will are more dehumanizing than mere violence. 
Violence may be used for any variety or purposes including committing sexual 
offenses. There is no distinct difference between the use of violence to steal a 
person's wallet versus the use of violence to commit a sexual offense. In either 
situation, the violence is being used to achieve an end. In one case, that end is a 
wallet. In the other case, that end is the victim' s body. What makes a violent rape 
more serious than a mugging is not the violence- it is the objective of the violence. 
The objective of sexual offenses is the theft of personhood. Actual possession of the 
victim is the purpose. In the mugging, violence can be avoided by simple handing 
over the wallet. In a sexual offense. theft of personhood will always occur regardless 
of the presence or absence of physical violence. 
310Befrran-Munguia, 489 F.3d at 1051 ("[T]he Oregon Revised Statute[] does not make 
'the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force ' an element oft he crime[.]"). 
311 United States v. Gomez-Gomez, 493 F.3d 562. 567 n.5 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting 
Sarmiento-Funes, 374 F.3d at 339 n.2) (emphasis added). 
312/d. 
Jl.lSee supra note 54. 
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"[A]ll rape is a form of soul murder ..... ,:,4 This statement is more than just a 
creative metaphor. The fact that rape is a common component of warfare and 
genocidc~ 1 5 is evidence of the destructive impact of non-consensual sex. 
"(T]hroughout history. the rape of hundreds of thousands of women and children in 
all regions of the world has been a bitter rcality.''116 These atrocious sexual acts are 
committed not as a collateral effect of war but as a strategy.317 The intent of this 
strategy goes beyond the devastating physical effects of the individual acts. The 
sexual act is meant ·'to degrade not just the individual woman but also to strip the 
humanity from the larger group of which she is a pan:·)t~ Logically, if you can 
objectify and degrade a people through .. soul murder." the extermination of their 
bodies through genocide becomes easier to rationalize. While not all non-consensual 
sex offenses are accompanied by the hon·ific physical violence that typifies war 
crimes, all forms of non-consensual sex nre an all"ront to individual humanity and a 
dehumanizing objectification 0 r the sou l. 
The views of male prisoners also serve as a strong refutation of Dripps' 
presupposition that most people view non-consensual sex as a better altcmative than 
violence. Male victims of rape demonstrate many of the same psychological effects 
shared by their female counter parts.11'1 Men experience fear, self-blame, and 
questioning of self-worth.'~" While men su tTer a variety of effects from rape. it 
seems illogical that these results are from 'iolence associated with the commission 
of the rape. Among the prison culture there is an ''unwritten code of inmate beliefs, 
that a real man 'would die before giving up his anal virginity . .-·m As one victim of 
prison rape stated, ''[m ]en are supposed to be strong enough to keep themselves from 
being raped.'' 1 ~2 This statement rcllccts a "common inmate belief that a real man 
would never submit to rape.' ' 1~3 These attitudes are not evidence of a preference of 
314Lynn.; llenderson. Rape and Respom.ibilily. 1 I LAw & PHIL I ?.7. 175 { 1992). 
JlSSee general~\' Christoph Schiess!. An Elemem t?f Genocide: Rape, Totul IVar. and 
International Law in the Twentieth Cen111ry. 4 J. GEMX' li)E RES. 197 {200~)-
-''6H UMAN RtCilll s w ArC II. SHAn t:Rt-.D Ltvt:s: Sr:xt:AL VrOLENcF. D URlNu Till:. RwANOAN 
GENOCIDE A:-.D ITS ArrFRMAHl 27 ( 1996). 
317 Jd. at 29, 41. 
~ 1 8/d. at 1-2. During the Rwandan genocide, "evidence indicates thai many rapists 
expected, con~equentto their attacks. that the psychological and physical assau lt on cach Tutsi 
woman would advance the cause of the destruction of the Tulsi people.'' /d. at 35. Rather 
than killing the women. "they would leave them to die from their grief." !d. 
319See JULIE A. ALLISO~ & L:\ \\ Rf-.:Cl: $. WRJ(illTSMAN. RAPE: T11r MISU\II>i:RSTOOO 
CRIME 48-49, I 54-55 ( 1993) (examining intra-gender rape and the shon and long term effects 
of rape). 
320/d. 
321 H UMAN RIGHTS WATCII, NO ESCAPE: MALE RAPE IN U.S. PRISONS, pt. VI (200 1 ), 
available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001 /prisonlreport.html (quoting Letter to Human 
Rights Watch (Oct. 31. 1996)). 
m /d. {quoting Letter to Human Rights Watch (Mar. 30, 1999)). 
-~ !d. at pt. V. 
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~mwanted sex over violence; qlllte the contrary, they reflect a willingness to engage 
m extreme violence to avoid sexual violation. 
VII. A COMMODITY BASED SOLUTION TO SOLVING THE SPLIT 
Based on the experimental testing of Dripps' theory through analyzing the circuit 
split, the solution is two fold. The solution tor the circuit split was s imple. Sexual 
offenses in violation of another's will force a sexual act upon the victim and should 
be treated as "crimes of violence." In November 200R, the Sentencing Guidelines 
were specifically amended to punish these violations of the will. In an effort to 
address the confusion created by "non-forcible" sex offenses. the definition of 
"crime of violence·· under§ 2L 1.2 o f the Sentencing Guidelines was changed to the 
following: 
iii) 'Crime of violl!nce · means any of the following ortcnscs under tederal, 
state, or local la-w: Murder, manslaughter, kidnapping. aggravated assault, 
forcible sex offenses (including ·where comem to the conduct is nol given 
or is not legal~\' valid. such as ll'here consent to the conduct is 
involuntary. incompetent. or coerced), statutory rape, sexual abuse of a 
minor, robbery, arson, extortion, extortionate extens ion of credit, burglary 
of a dwelling. or any other offense under federal, state, or local law that 
has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical 
force against the person of another.-1 ~4 
The second solution, speaking directly to Dripps' theoretical system, is much 
broader and deals with the value placed on violations of the will. Sexual autonomy 
may be described as a commodity. Historically, control of sexuality has been viewed 
as a property right.325 Conceptualizing individual autonomy in terms of a property 
3z4U.S. SF.NTEN\ING CIL'IDELINEs § 2L 1.2, Application Note I (B)( iii) (2008) (emphasis 
added). The Sentencing Commission gives thc following explanation for the change: 
!d. 
First, the amendment clarities the scope of the tenn "l(>rcible sex offense'' as that tenn 
is used in the definition or··crime of violence·· in§ 2L1.2, Application Note I(B)(iii). 
The amendment provides that the term "forcible sex otTense" includes crimes ·'where 
consent to the conduct is not given or is not legally valid. such as where consent to the 
conduct is involuntary. incompetent. or coerced." The amendment makes clear that 
forcible sex oftenses. like all o!Tenses enumerated in Application Note I (B)(iii), "are 
always classified as 't:rimes of violence,' regardkss of whether the prior offense 
expressly has as an clement the use. attempted use, or threatened use of physical force 
against the person of another,'' USSC, Guideline Manual. Supplement to Appendix C, 
Amendment 658. Application of the amendment. therefore. would result in an 
outcome that is contrary to cases excluding crimes in which "there may be assent in 
fact but no legally valid consent'' from the scope of·'torciblc sex offenses.'' 
325SAINT TIIOMAS AQUJN.'\S. ON LAW, MORALITY. AND POLrJJCS 176 (William P. 
Baumgarth & Richard J. Regan eds., 1988 ). Saint Thomas Aquinas described rape in terms of 
a property offense. /d. at 180. According to Aquinas. there were two categories of property 
offenses-theft and robbery. ld. at 176. Theil involved taking another's property through 
stealth or in secret. !d. at I 8 1. Robbery involved taking another's propet1y forcibly or 
through violence. /d. Rape was viewed as being more serious than theft because it ''takes 
what is another's, not as a possession but as a part.'' ld. at 180. Aquinas viewed the wife as 
being part of her husband as a limb is part or the body. /d. Aquinas addressed the issue of 
whether rape is always forcibk. stating, "(t]he robbery of a woman cannot be secret on the 
39Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2009
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right can serve as a helpful philosophical basis for punishing violations of autonomy. 
Certainly the body and sexuality should be controlled by the individual. However, if 
viewed as a commodity, a very high value should be placed on the freedom from 
unwanted sex. Dripps sells short the commodity of sexual autonomy. 
Sexual crimes are typically punished at the state level according to individual 
state statutes. Some states, as illustrated by the California "forcible rape" statute 
analyzed in Gomez-Gomez, have approached defining sexual crimes more in terms of 
lack of consent.326 However, as seen in the decisions making up the 2007 circuit split 
over§ 2LI.2 of the Guidelines, non-consensual sex offenses are still often viewed as 
less serious than other violent crimes. 
If the number of incidents of all forms of sexual violence is to be reduced, society 
needs to address the root of violent crime-dehumanization of the victim. 
Fundamentally there must be a change in the way the offender views the victim. 
Theoretically, society must emphasize the violation of the will as the essence of what 
makes sexual ortenses wrong and craft the law to reflect this value. lt is illogical to 
assume that sexual offenders will view their victims as anything more than objects as 
long as society and the courts do not view violations of the will as serious. Society's 
view must change and recognize non-consensual sex offenses as serious crimes. 
This is the only way to reduce these otfenses. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Non-consensual sex offenses violate the victim's will and should be punished as 
serious crimes. What truly makes all sexual crimes heinous is the invasive violation 
of the will. The will is violated whether or not violent physical force accompanies 
the particular crime. Sexual crimes against another's will are "the ultimate violation 
of self' and express "almost total contempt for . . . personal integrity and 
autonomy."327 As Justice Burger stated, "[r]ape is not a mere physical attack it is 
destructive of the human personality."m These offenses dramatically affect the 
victim physically, emotionally, and psychologically.329 Society's failure to 
adequately address these crimes only contributes to the devaluation of the individual. 
Perhaps you have overheard a conversation like the following. This conversation 
was not necessarily serious and, for the participants, nothing that would be 
remembered after a few hours. One guy was describing the object of his fantasies 
for a group of eager listeners. He had seen his ideal around school, across the room 
in a few classes, and on stage in the occasional musical or dance recital. 1-1 is 
description of the ideal included the flowing dark hair that one could get lost in, the 
part of the woman who is taken: wherefore, even if it be secret as regards the other$ from 
whom she is taken, the nature of robbery remains on the patt of the woman to whom violence 
is done." /d. at 182. Under a modem theory of sexual autonomy, in which every individual 
(male or female) controls his or her sexuality. application of Aquinas ' theory would result in 
sexual violations being viewed as robbery and inherently forcible. 
326United States v. Gomez-Gomez, 493 F.3d 562, 565 (5th Cir. 2007). See also N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 2c: 14-2c( I) (West 2009) (defining sexual assault in terms of coercion rather than 
merely physical force). 
327Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 ( 1977). 
328 /d. at 612 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
329See RAINN, supra note 55. 
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well-endowed breasts. and the tightly formed buttocks. These comments were met 
with common admiration for "good tastes," speculation regarding cup size. and 
insight into how a flexible dancer could perform. 
Suddenly, one of the eager listeners interjected, "Hey, I think I know who you're 
talking about, her name is .... " 
Before the eager listener could reveal the ideal 's name, the describer retorted. 
"Don't tell me the name, you'll ruin it! " 
The conversation died down. 
This conversation, while lacking class, was by no means criminal or unusual. 
However, while seemingly innocuous, it illustrates the ease of objectification that 
can take place even among otherwise upstanding individuals. A legal system that 
does not recognize the gravity of the harms caused by non-consensual sex can be just 
as dehumanizing. Society, legislators, and judges must recognize the value of sexua l 
autonomy and adequately punish violations of the will. 
41Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2009
42https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol57/iss2/9
